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Introduction. 4
1. Life and Education of Dewey
John Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont, October
20, 1859. He attended the public schools there, and received
his Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Vermont in
1879. Five years later, he finished his 7/0 rlc for the Doctor-
ate of Philosophy in Johns Hopkins University (1884). Then
"He took Greeley’s counsel and went west, teaching philosophy."
He became instructor and assistant professor of Philosophy in
the University of Michigan in 1884 and remained in that insti-
tution until 1888. .Vhile there, he wrote his first publica-
tions, Psychology and Leibniz; A Critical Exposition . IText he
taught philosophy in the University of Minnesota for a year.
In 1889 he was invited back to the University of Michigan,
where he remained as professor and the head of the department
of philosophy until 1894. During this period, he finished his
Outline of Ethics , 1891, and his Study of Ethics , 1893. In
1894 he was made the head of the Department of Philosophy and
Pedagogy in the University of Chicago. It was there that John
Dewey, by his excellent work "first caught the eyes of the
world. It was in those years that he revealed the resolute
2
experimental bent of his thought." Also in 1894 he v/as the
joint author of Psychology of Humber . His School and Society
was published in 1900. The signal for a new trend of thought.

2knovm as the Chicago School iDecaine thoroughly established
when his collective v/ork Studies in Logical Theory was pub-
lished in 1903, 7/illiam James commented thus: "Chicago has
a School of Thought! It deserves the title of a new system
3
of philosophy."
Dewey probably felt that he had done his part in
Chicago, for he accepted a professorship in Columbia Univer-
sity in the following year (1904). The University of Wiscon-
sin recognized his contribution and conferred on him the degree
of Doctor of Laws. In 1908 in collaboration with Tufts, he
published his Ethics . In the following year his How V^e Think
was published. This year seemed to mark the beginning of his
productive period of thought. In 1910 his The Influence of
Darwin on Philosophy appeared. Three years later came "perhaps
his greatest book Democracy and Education ." Here he draws
"the varied lines of his philosophy to a point, and centers them
4
all on the task of developing a better generation." In 1915
Dewey and his daughter, by cooperative work, expressed their
ideals in education in Schools of To-morrow . In the same year
he published German Philosophy and Politics . Then the changes
and development of Dewey *3 thought came to a culmination, and
were explicitly expressed in the epoch-making v/ork Essays in
Experimental Logic
,
which appeared in 1916. In the following
year he proclaimed to the philosophical world "the need for a
recovery of philosophy" in the cooperative volume, Creative
Intelligence . Three years later he made his conviction kno\7n to
m
Orientals through his lectures. on Reconstruction in Philosophy.
Vv’v
3He spent two years in China lecturing to teachers on educational
reforms* "It is not too much to say that most students in China
not only know the name of Dewey, hut also accept his philosophy
5
as ‘workable* in China, especially in the educational field."
IText his report in 1924 to the Tiirkish Ciovernment on the reorgan-
ization of their national schools exerted great influence on
the education of the people of that country.
In 1925, when his Sxperience and Nature appeared,
the reviewer of the Hew York Herald Tribune said, "with monumen-
tal care, detail, and completeness professor Dewey has in this
volume revealed the metaphysical heart that beats its unvarying,
alert tempo through his writings, whatever their explicit
6
themes", T\vo years later, his social and political interest
again came to the fore, and there appeared The Public and Its
Problems , The Sixth International Congress of Philosophy was
held at Harvard, where Dewey’s frank and hiunble, yet stimula-
ting address, "The Rfile of Philosophy in the History of Civili-
zation", was a plea for speculative philosophy. In \7hi ther
Mankind—A Panorama of Modern Civilization--Dewey contributed
7
a chapter on philosophy; and in the October 1928 issue of
The Yorld To-morrow , Dewey’s article "The Critique of American
Civilization" manifests clearly his interest in civilization
and his philosophical stand. In addition to this, the report
of his trip to Russia was an actual investigation of social
8
and cultural experiment of the Soviet principles.
"The hour makes the man, and the man makes the
hour", so says a Chinese proverb. Dewey lived his early life

4in the hour of the great, powerful forthcoming of the industrial
application of modern sciences. Generally speaking, his was an
age of great promise for the coming of both social and intel-
lectual emancipation. His Vermont environment, moreover, af-
forded him a spirit of "rustic simplicity" by which he is often
characterized. At this time sociology began to receive its
popularity; social service or social salvation was the cry in
the wilderness. Social psychology, social evolution, and
social theories of general education and of religious education--
all came to the front. American philosophy since 1870 has been
an "Ausgang des Intellec tualismus in der Philosophie der Gegen-
wart"; the positive courses, as described by Dr, George G. Cell,
are evolutionary, personalistic
,
pragmatic, and realistic.
Unerson’s address "The American Scholar" (1837) was a declara-
tion of the intellectual independence of Araerica. "In Hinerson’s
Beruhmtem Harvard-Vortrag 1837 uber den "American Scholar" oder
das Ideal des "Man Thinking", brachte er das bewusstsien einer
neuen Kulturepoche fiir Araerika klar und kraftig zum Ausdruck:
"Our day of dependence draws to a close". Das ist gewiss eine
Idee, kein fait accompli, er sah aber glaubenstark der Vollen-
dung entgegen, wo die Kulturabhangikeit von der alten Welt
9
durch ein Verbal tnis der Wechselwirkung abgelost wird". Just
a few months before Dewey received his Bachelor’s degree, Charles
Peirce's article "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" appeared in
The Popular Science Monthly and in the Revue Philosophique
(Jan. 1879). However, "The work commenced by Peirce", Dewey
says, "was continued by William James Tlie article which
A
'\
5Peirce wrote in 1878 coiainanded almost no attention from phil-
osophical circles....”. It was not until ”1898 that James
inaugurated the new pragmatic movement in an address entitled,
10
"Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results”. Prior
to the publication of the Principles of Psychology of ’William
James in 1890, challenges and influences had come from the
quarters of the critics of Hegel, especially from Andrew Seth.
The greatest challenge of all v/as the appearance of Andrew Seth’s
Hegelianism and Personality in 1887. The title of the book
clearly indicates some incompatibility betv/een Hegelianism and
personality. One of the problems which occupied the mind of
Dewey was the problem of thought and reality; therefore we ap-
preciate Dewey’s new formulations. Dewey, writing on the
development of American pragmatism reaffirmed the indebtedness
of the authors of Studies in Logical Theory to V/illiam James
for their "instruments”. The Principles of Psychology of
Tilliam James, then, made great contributions to the Chicago
School!
From his v/ritings and his activities, v/e have seen
that his interests in life problems have been diverse. Tie have
observed the practical effect of the ^est on Dewey and that
the position he occupied as the head of the Department of Phil-
osophy and Pedagogy gave the hour v/hich shaped the man. From
another angle of approach, v/e now see him making a new v/orld
of education. Following Peirce, he sees the importance of
the instrumentality whereby ideas may be made clear, and the
real end the ideal connected. After How \7e Think was written

6he turned to the problem of education in a democracy. Dewey
showed the close relation betv/^een education and democracy, making
"personal culture" the foundation of "social efficiency". He
believed that there cannot be "a society really v/orth serving
unless it is constituted of individuals of significant quali-
11
ties". "Moreover, intelligence has descended from its lone-
ly isolation at the remote edge of things, v/hence it operated
as unmoved mover and ultimate good, to take its seat in the
12
moving affairs of men." Human affairs or humanity, the v«rhole
of it, is his interest sjid the interest of philosophy as well.
Adapting the Darwinian logic, he emphasized adaptation and
control of environraent through the instrumentalities of intelli-
gence or ideas. Accepting the position of Comte, he said that
neither epistemology nor metaphysics should dominate philosophy.
The Bergsonian elan vital does not satisfy him as an explana-
13
tion of reality; to him the life-process itself is reality.
Because of his wide interest in life, he lays great stress on
the function and relation of philosophy to social gjid political
problems. He says, "Philosophy clings like a timid spinster
to the old-fashioned problems and ideas; ’direct pre-occupation
with contemporary difficulties is left to literature and poli-
14
tics’". He holds that the experimental method and attitudes
are to be carried out in the solution of social problems. "Bet-
ter it is for philosophy to err in active participation in the
living struggles and issues of its own age and times than to
maintain an immune monastic impeccability, without relevancy
15
and bearing in the generating ideas of its contempora,ry present.
Intellectual clarity is necessary only in a specific field, be-
II

7cause mere theorizing or pre-experimenta-l notions disappear
since they become increasingly irrelevant to the situation
discovered, and with this detected irrelevance they become
16
meaningless and uninteresting, "The aim of philosophy, then,
is to become, as far as is humanly possible, an organ for deal-
ing with these conflicts (It is to be catholic and far-
sighted theory of the adjustment of the conflicting fantors
17
of life."
2, Preliminary Statement of the Problem
The problem for investigation in this dissertation
is to find the meaning of experience in the thought of John
Dev/ey, and to consider the relation between his enlarged con-
ception of experience and the "persistent problems of philosophy".
These questions vvill naturally follow: Has he solved the prob-
lems which he, has set for himself? Is his experience-philosophy
positivistic? Is his theory of experience consistent with his
system as a whole?
The method of approach will be synoptic, since the
investigation aims at a coherent interpretation of Dewey’s
meaning of experience, and its position in his system as a
v/hole. This, consequently, involves an investigation of all
the relevant writings of John Dewey, As to the procedure of
this investigation, it is first empirical and objective, whereby
a true exposition may be brought about— an exposition which is
true to Dewey’s own position in the meanings of definitions
and terminologies. In other words, the method may be called
analytical when restricted to the exposition of the problem
under investigation. To judge the value of the nev^ conception
' I -i'-
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8of experience and its consistent position in the system as a
whole demands a critical and synoptic method. This means that
his position will he evaluated in the light of human experience
in its Y/holeness, and that it will be compared with other inter-
pretations of experience.
2, The Significance of the Problem under Investigation
Dewey starts the volume Creative Intelligence with
an essay, '‘The Heed for a Recovery of Philosophy", and asserts
that the recovery will take place only v/hen philosophy gives
up the traditional view of experience for the new. This is
not to say that Dev/ey did not conceive this before the a,ppear-
ance of this book. As early as 1903 he had set up his o\7n
position concerning experience in opposition to the German
idealists in particular. This had already caught the eyes of
contemporary philosophers before the Essays in Experimental
Logic appeared in 1916. Dewey says, "The key to understanding
the doctrines of the essays herewith reprinted, lies in the
18
passages regarding the temporal development of experience".
This also forms an issue between the Chicago and Cambridge
Schools, and the separation of them ought to arouse intellectual
curiosity, Dewey, according to many, "rejects metaphysics as
19
the echo and disguise of theology". This gives us a very
important question for reflection, "Is or is not Dewey thor-
oughly positivistic?".
The theory of experience, moreover, is crucial for
the problems of beha.viorism and self-psychology, for the con-
ception of science and philosophy, and for the theory of value.

9Thus Rogers points out that Dev/ey seemed to have hegun a
20
"flanking movement", rendering the traditional problems of
philosophy meaningless. Hence, there has been a growing in-
terest in the theory of experience in the thought of John Dev/ey.
Of. course we do not intend to attribute every philosophical
writing on experience to the influence of Dewey, for the modern
tendency to study experience goes back to Kant, and is definite-
ly expressed in Jacobi against Spinoza and Lotze against Kegel.
7/e may briefly name a few of the contemporary out-
standing articles and books on the meaning of experience in
general and those on Dev/ey ’s conception of experience in parti-
cular. S. H. Hodgson published his Metaphysics of Experience
in 1899; Daillie, three years after the appearance of the
Studies in Logical Theory wrote An Idealistic Construction of
Zibcperience . Bawden's Princ iples of Pragmatism attempts to give
a philosophic a.l interpretation of experience. P. Adams’
Reason and .Ibcperience and Miss Mary P. Pollett’s Creative /Ex-
perience appeared in the same year, 1924. Viscount Haldane’s
Human Experience is a criticism of Dewey’s Experience and ITatiire
,
1926. Hart, a follower of Dewey, v/rote Inside Experience in 1927.
For the sake of brevity I shall enumerate the important articles
on experience:
Boodin, J. E. "Is Experience Self-supporting?"
Journal of Philosophy 5(1908),
365-375.
"
"Energy and Reality", ibid. 393-406.
Creighton, J. S. "Experience and Thou.ght", Philosophical
Review 15(1906), 482-493.
"
"The Standpoint of lixperience"
,
Philoso -
phical Review 12(1903), 593-610.

10
II
.?rank, L. K,
Holland, lU, H.
James, '7,
IicGillvary, S.3.
Ilorgan, 0. L.
Rogers, A. K.
Sellars, R. '7,
Swabey, '7. G.
II
’7eiinan, H. IT.
•'The Associational Conception of
"Experience'', Philosophical Reviev/
9(1900), 268-292.
"The ]hq)eri enc e-Philo sophy"
,
Philoso -
phical Revie?; 15(1906), 1-16.
"The Locus of Experience", Journal
of Philosophy 20(1923), 327-329.
"Relation of Science to Concrete
ExiDerience"
,
Philosophical Review
15(1906), 614-626.
"A 'Jorld of Pure Experience", Journal
of Philosophy 1(1904), 533-543.
"Experience as Pure and Consciousness
as lleaning"
,
Journal of Philosophy
8(1911), 511-525.
"The natural History of }ibcperience"
,
British Journal o f Psychology III,
1
,
2
,
1- 20 .
"Epistemology and Jhcperience"
,
Philoso -
phical Review 7(1899), 466-
"The nature of Experience", Journal
of Philosophy 4(1907), 14-13.
"Kant’s Analogies of Experience",
Philosophical Review 31(1922), 41-57.
"The Phenomenology of Experience",
Philosophical Review 33(1924), 51-66.
"Experience, Hind, and the Concept",
Journal of Philosophy 21(1924), 561-572
Finally, Dewey has had great influence on the youth
of China to-day. Since the one making the investigation is a
Chinese, this fact arouses in him a personal interest in the
philosophy of John Dewey. Having been trained primarily with-
in an idealistic school of thought, he believes a study of the
’opposing’ school will inevitably help to bring about a bal-
anced view of philosophy. China to-day, so far as her intellec

11
tual position is concerned, is in a new formative period; the
future depends upon the thinking youth of to-day. Thus the
problem under investigation seems to the writer of great sig-
nificance.
4. Other Investigators of this Subject
Strictly speaking, our main task is to deal 7/1 th the
thought of John Dewey in his conception of experience; there-
fore, the theories of experience in the history of thought will
not be touched upon unless they are relevant to the present
investigation. The existing literature on Dewey may be well
represented by such writers as Lovejoy, Howard, Schinz, Leroux,
Haldane, and Hart.
Professor Lovejoy takes up three questions in his
Essays in Critical Realism; Does pragmatism imply the truth
of realism or of idealism, or of neither? If it is in any
sense realistic, is it so in a monistic, or a dualistic, or
in some third sense? Does it, expressly or by implication,
affirm, or admit, or deny the existence of consciousness, of
21
mental states, or of psychical entities? As a result of
the investigation Lovejoy found both realistic and idealistic
elements in Dewey’s writings. Lovejoy also points out that
Devvey is at once in favor of "immediatism" and realism with a
22
dualistic theory of knowledge; and that, viewing Dewey’s argu-
23 24
raent as a whole, he is after all "epistemologically minded".
To the last question Lovejoy says that Dewey defines "mental"
25
in his own sense as "exercise of intellectual function" or
26
as a "distinctive status of suggesting", but knowing and
i
12
27
apprehending "both are natural events.
Lovejoy, possibly following ‘Williatn James, put a
similar question as to whether Dewey deals with the problem
of how two minds know the same thing and how they know each
other. This problem is crucial for his pragmatism, because
he has aimed at a logic of action and operation and a logic of
social interaction and cooperation. In an article on "Prag-
matism and Interactionism"
,
Lovejoy discusses more thoroughly
the question of interaction in the thought of Dewey. There
Lovejoy tries to show that to Dewey philosophy can enter
again into the realistic thought, conversation of cojmnon- sense,
and science, where "dualisms are just dualities, distinctions
having an instruimental and practical, but not ultimate meta-
physical worth; or rather, having metaphysical worth in a
loractical and experimental sense, not in that of indicating a
23
radical existential cleavage in the nature of things."
D. T. Howard of Northwestern University has a book
on John Dewey’s Lo ;ical Theory , in which the early writings
of Dewey were treated in a historical order. He tries to show
that Dewey takes psychology as his philosophic method because
he holds that the real esse of things is neither their percipi
(philosophy of nature), nor their intelligi ( logic ) , but the
concrete reality of their experiri, the essence of v/hich is
29
psychology. After Dewey received the influence of biological
evolutionism, he began to eliminate the transcendental factors
in the interpretation of experience. Logic, to Dewey, is not
to be separated from biology and psychology, since the act of
knowing and the ideas which it employs have a psychological basis.
Ii
13
Dewey labels his own metaphysics naturalistic, the
best review of which is found in Santayana’s article ’’Dewey’s
30
naturalistic Metaphysics" • Santayana deals with two ques-
tions: (l) In what sense is his system naturalistic? (2) In
what sense is it metaphysical? Dewey has chosen "events"
which have natural endings, culminations, and consujrimations
31
as his metaphysical elements. "On this material framework"
then "hang all the immaterial objects such as words, feelings,
and ideas, which may be eventually distinguished in human ex-
32
perience." He attributes two motives to Dewey’s naturalis-
tic metaphysics; namely, first, he hopes to deal a’ death blow
to "the habit of hypostatizing" ; second, he hopes to interpret
the spirit of the age, a philosophy of enterprise.
Another aspect of Dewey’s thought is pointed out by
Murphy; that is, "objective relativism". Objectivity and
relativity seem to be incompatible; the incompatibility is
well illustrated by the struggle between monistic and dualistic
realists. V/hen Dewey proposes a realism without monism or
dualism, he is said to be not playing the game. However, the
foundation of his proposition lies in the "inversion in the
33
relation of objects and events". "Every existence is an
event"; and "an event is the very happening itself not
34
v/hat it becomes it is becoming." Events depend upon
relations, but they are not relations. Objects are characters
of events, but not vice versa, because objects are events with
meaning, which is again to be found in communication or inter-
action. 'ile start then from mere existence or occurrence which
is to be taken as substantive. Therefore, the world of ’objec-
f
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14
tive relativisra* is a mixture of finality and dependence, of
35
immediacy and transcendence. Murphy, a.t the end of the article,
points out that Dev/ey has not freed himself from "the flesh-
36
pots of bifurcation in a full and unambiguous way". The criti-
cism of a "separation betv/een qualities barely occurring and
those occurring as meanings" is re-made, after Murphy, by Hall
in his article "Some Meanings of Meaning in Experience and
37
Mature" .
In conversation with Professor Dev;ey I asked from
vThat corners of the philosophical world he had received the
harshest and v/orst attack upon his philosophical position, es-
pecially on the meaning of experience. The reply. was Viscount
Haldane’s Human Zbcperience. Therefore, an analysis of this
work will be of great interest. The purpose of this book, a-s
he tells us, is "a philosophical inquiry’’ into the nature and
meaning of human experience" its implications, and the re-
38
lation of mind to the objective world. His analysis of Dewey’s
position is very precise and clear and mostly correct. He says,
"Professor Dewey’s principle, is that there is no such difference
in character, and no such line of logical demarcation, either
in fact or in theory of knov/ledge, as are sometimes supposed to
exist between intelligence and what is commonly called experience.
Subject and object are inseparable and they fall within the
same order of existence. V.'hat we call knov/ledge is simply mean-
ing, u.and meaning itself is a stage in experience to which its
natural evolution gives rise. Experience is thus, in the ultimate
order of existence, prior to knowledge, and the latter is its product
and not any condition preliminary to its reality. lOiov/ledge is not

15
only no entity separate from nature, but it disappears excepting
39
as a result arising casually from tlie interaction of events."
Schinz, representing the French temperament, direct-
ed a * vigorous’ and ’passionate’ attack against pragmatism
when pragmatism was at the height of its glory around 1909.
He opens his volume by defining pragmatism as "opportunism",
v/hich, as a doctrine, does not make good. "But pragmatism
as revealing a certain state of mind in our present generation
40
has a profound significance." Schinz devoted a chapter to
Dewey in his Anti -pragmatism . In this chapter he points out
the main interest in Dewey’s thought expressed in the title
of one of Dewey’s articles, "Logical Conditions of a Scientific
Treatment of Morality" (Chicago, 1903). In this article, accord-
ing to Schinz, Dev/ey "has only reduced scientific judgments to
41
moral judgments, thus the logic of science to the logic of ethics."
Schinz, who seems incapable of clearly grasping the motive of
Dewey, loses the force of his arguments. It is quite true to
Dewey’s interest that ethics ^should be brought nearer to physical
sciences, whereby "arbitrariness in definitions and concepts"
42
or a priori principles may be removed. In his criticism,
Schinz shows another fundamental conception of a philosophical
problem, namely "ultimate teleology", which Dewey denies. "The
moral ideal itself is only a product of this combination ( the
reciprocal determination of the judger and the situation judged)
43
and must vary from epoch to epoch...." A moral ideal is as
"natural" as any other event. Finally Schinz asserts that
Dewey is "intellectualistic " and "the most philosophical mind
44
among the pragmatists."
•i
16
Shortly after Schinz’ Anti-pragmatism came out, Pratt’s
'jThat is Pragmatism appeared. In exposition, Pratt says, "Prag-
matism may he regarded as the result of two confluent, though
not altogether consistent, streams of tendency. The first.,,.
Kant's doctrine of practical reason revived and reformulated
in 1896 by Professor James’s "Will to Believe" ,,. The second and
probably the more important source of pragmatism is the modern
scientific view of the meaning of hypothesis. Hypotheses
are handy ways of telling us what has happened or what we may
exi^ect. They are....ways of summarizing and explaining our
45
experience,
"
Pratt traces two viev/s concerning truth in the prag-
matists’ writings; the radical view and the modified, "The
former holds that truth is the process of verification v/hich
goes on within experience; that it consists in the successful
v/orking of the idea, in the concrete steps v/ithin consciousness
that lead from the unverified claim to the full and satisfying
46
assurance of its ’goodness'," Truth, to Dewey, then, falls
47
wholly within our experiences or experienced relations.
The fundaraental postulates of "immediate empiricism"
is just this; that things are what they are experienced as
being; or that to give a just account of anything is to tell
48
what that is experienced to be," Everything is to be under-
stood and explained within experience. In other words, meaning
is to be found in experience, Ivnowledge, for instance, is
"a doubt-inquiry-ansv/er experience". Transcendence, to Dewey,
if it is recognized, is to be viewed as any other natural
49
process falling within individual experience.
The significant criticism, as it seems to me, is Pratt’s

17
comparison between James and Dewey, and his pointing out that
the latter does not go far enough, James says that one’s
"subjective way of feeling things" does not exhaust all the
demands of human nature, for we constantly try to establish
50
the "objective truth" of all possible experiences, 7/hereas
Dev/ey takes the "social" and "natural" environment of man as
the ultimate boundaries of human experience and denies any
"objective truth" as such.
Thus far 7ie have reviewed the criticisms directed
against various phases of pragmatism. It remains to consider
Ivloore’s Pragmatism and Its Critics
,
a defense of pragmatism.
In this book Moore tries to show, first of all, some of the
important issues, one of which is the predilection of the prag-
matists for "continuity" engendered and reinforced by the
development of biology and sociology. "Suffice it to say,
therefore, that concerning the place and function of thinking
is experience (or in the v/orld) the pragmatist became convinced
that not only do will and purpose involve ideas, but that all
ideas are volitional and purposive, and therefore ideas cannot
be "true" or "false" entirely independent of their purposive
51
and volitional character,"
Moore, in su:araarizing the issues, has v.^ell indicated
the pragmatic position, psychologically, logically, ethically,
52
politically, metaphysically, and theologically. The whole
pragmatic movement expresses its strength in a march toward
the direction of'
a
self-supporting, self-controlling, and self-
propelling experience. 3ven this book was written fifteen
years before the appearance of Dewey’s jlxperience and ITature
f
cc
18
Iloore seemed to liave expressed Dev/ey’s essential position:
’'Zlxperience oan stand and go upon its o’;m legs;.... it can find
within itself the source and supoort of its values of truth
53
and error, right and wrong.”
Among the critics, Lloore seems to have taken up the
challenge from 5’ite most appreciatively. In answer to the
challenge of "subjectivism” Iloore asserts that reality is co-
extensive with experience but not necessarily subjective-ex-
perience, because "experience must be reduced (l) to mere
thought experience, and (2) to my thought- experience before
54
it becomes subjective.” This, we believe, manifests the
"objectivism” in pragmatism.
K. Leroux devotes a whole chapter to "La Logique
instrumentals de IT. Dewey et I’ecole de Chicago” in his admir-
able work, Le Pragmatisms Am^ricain et Anglais . M. Leroux
starts imraediately from Dewey’s essential concept L’ exp'erience.
"Le caractere organique et le caractere dynajnique” in Dev/ey’s
55
thought may be traced to the Hegelian influence. II. Leroux
also points out that even when the problem "de la connaissance
ait cesse d’occuper la premiere place dans la i^ensee de M.
Dewey”, et ”11 parait s ’ interesser d’abord principalement aux
questions morales, ici encore I’influence de Hegel est, du
noins au debut, nredominante. (L’ auteur le declare lui-m^me
56
dans ses Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics , 1891).”
ITo true interpretation of Dewey has ever failed in
pointing out that the notion of experience is essential in his
system. Leroux says that M. Dewey "insists sur la nCcessite
de recourir a 1’ experience immediate pour d^finir le sens de
Lc
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toutes les notions discut^es en philosopliie,." A II. De\7ey,
"la philosophie ne se distingue pas de la science par ra^thode,
mais par le probleme auquel elle repond." "II. Dewey pourrait
la d^finir avec M. Bawden comme une theorie generale de 1’ ex-
58
perience." Leroux concludes that "M. Dewey adopte sans
59
doute un langage plus proche du naturalisme.
"
Hart’s Inside Hxi^erience is an interpretation of
Dewey’s spirit in that he deals with the same crucial problems
of the structure of experience and its articulations, in the
main true to Dewey’s line of thought. The denotative method
and the interpretation of experience are manifested in taking
"every concept of experience" to "be experienced" and the
understanding of which has its root in "actual experiences"
(somev/here and somehow). In the "continuity of experience"
one discovers himself and his vrorld.
Hart classifies the interpretation of experience
into four types: (l) the skeptical, (2) the intuitional, (3) the
60
idealistic and the realistic, (4) the coherent, Dewey’s
interpretation, by Hart, is classified under the coherent which
accepts "all experiences as valid for whatever they may turn
out to be", and leaves the door of possibility open for what-
61
ever may happen. As to the kinds of exi:>erience. Hart follows
62
Dewey.
jbcperience and nature are one, but matter and mind
are two characters of nature. The former is the senuential
63
order; the latter, meaning and significance. The modes may
be dichotomous in critical judgment, but "the original wholeness
64
of experience must not be ignored and denied,"
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The foregoing summaries of the significant works on
Dewey may he condensed and tabulated under the headings of
exposition and criticism;
Exoosition Criticism
1. Dewey is after all
"epistemologically minded"
—
with idealistic and realistic
elements in his thought.
2. "Immediate Unpiricisra"
postulates that "things are
what they are experienced as"
3. lilarly Idealistic and
Hegelian heritage continues
in Dewey’s thought.
4. naturalistic meta-
physics-- "events"
,
"ohj ects"
"affairs", " situations" , --
metaphysical nerves.
5. 'ifhile Moore expounded
Dev;ey’s thought and attempt-
ed to answer the critics,
and Hart reproduced Dewey’s
naturalistic conception of
experience, Ratner, orient-
ed his thought, in The Phil-
osophy of John Dewey .
1. Dewey is not "clear"
because his is not "simple"
and "easy" in his "specula-
tions" •
2. Subjectivism Exper-
ience is almost identified
with subjective experience.
3. Intellectualism--
He is fond of using dialectics.
4.
Characterized as
"half-hearted naturalist" by
the "dogmatic naturalist".
5.
Some charges are still
unanswered: Is not the intellec-
tual desire(knowledge for its
own sake) to be satisfied, as
it is a pragmatic issue?
The common sense ex-
perience is the "explicandura"
of philosophy. To find vihat
experience is and means is to
philosophize--experience, a magic
circle.
The question of experience, then, remains a fundamental
problem of philosophy, and a problem crucial in the system of
John Dewey. This investigation aims at a systematic formula-
tion of the meaning of experience as implied and expressed in
Dewey’s various philosophical writings.
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Chapter I
A SYITOPTIG PRSSMTATIOIT OF DS'.TFY’^S POSITIOM'
A* The Development of Dewey’s Interests in Philosophy.
1. His early interest in establishing '‘continuity”,
Dev/ey’s life and education have been mentioned
in the Introduction, as has also his environment. There is,
nevertheless, still occasion to locate his position in the
history of thought, 'Jilliam James speaks of philosophies as
"just so many visions, modes of feeling the v/hole push, and
1
seeing the v^hole drift of life”, and they are, on the one hand,
"forced on one by one’s total character and experience”, and
on the other hand they are "on the whole preferred, ... as one’s
2
best working attitude". Dewey has his "vision". He says
that when the essays were published in 1903, idealism was in
practical command of the philosophical field in both England
and America, but that since then there has been an impressive
3
revival of realism. Dewey says, "This marked alteration of
intellectual environment subjects the doctrine of the essays
4
to a test not contemplated when they were written." His
"vision", however, of bringing a synthesis of the idealistic
and sensualistic logics, as he felt, ought to be continued,
Dewey’s "motivation and direction" in the Essays in Experimental
Lor:ic aim at a synthesis- of the idealistic and realistic ele-
ments, recognizing that "objects of knowledge in their capacity
of distinctive objects of knowledge are determined by intelli-
5
gence" and "acknowledging that certain brute existences detect-
ed or laid bare by thinking, but in no v;ay constituted out of
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thought or any menta.l process, set every problem for reflection
and hence serve to test its otherwise merely speculative re-
6
suits." This quite consistently crresponds with his earlier
expression that a synthesis is needed between the antinomy of
7
Kantian reason or ideality and Humian empiricism.
His ov/n experience-philosophy is "reflective,
voluntaristic, and experimental", which alone affords the con-
nection and the continuity of the "given" and the ideal, because
it "acknowledges the transitive character of experience" and
the'possible control of the character of the transition by means
8
of intelligent effort." These are mere illustrations from
his own "vision". Objectively, we have his able and critical
contemporary, William James, who, in the review of the Studies
in Logical Theory (1904), says, "Taking it ^ gros , what strikes
me most in it is the great sense of concrete reality with which
it is filled. It seems a promising via media between the era-
9
piricist and transcendentalist tendencies of our time."
The term "continuity" in Dewey’s philosophy,
then, has two meanings: First, continuity is the connection
of the "two insulated universes" made by historical dualisms.
Experience is a continuous process instead of appearance on
the one side and reality on the other. Second, the levels or
fields of interaction is a continuous growth-process. The
later does not exist without the earlier, and the later makes
use of the earlier. It is, therefore, at once a metaphysical
and genetic continuity. The continuity of thought process and
its content is only one of the instances of this in experience.

23
2. The inner development of his interests.
The principle of interaction may be applied to
various aspects of life. The reciprocality of interest and
change is one of the application. The more intensely one’s
interest centers in a given situation, the greater the chal-
lenge and the problem. The challenge or problem changes with
the direction of the interest; the interest, in turn, changes
as the new demand or new problem emerges. Therefore, one is
bound to change or shift his interest as life goes on. It is
true in general as well as in particular, whether in a profes-
sion or in any research or study. Under four topics; namely,
point of view, essential quality of life, ethics, and generali-
zation of value. Professor Perry characterizes Dewey’s position
as follows; technology, intelligence, opportunism, and oro-
10
gressivism, respectively. They characterize his interest
in philosophy very well. As a teacher of philosophy and psy-
chology, Dewey’s first interest was in these two fields. Out
of this interest he wrote the Psychology and the Critical -ibc-
position of Leibniz and articles on the relation of these two
fields. Later he showed that his interest turned to ethics
before he was made the Head of the Department of Philosophy and
Pedagogy of the University of Chicago. M. Leroux is of the
same opinion, for he says, "Pendant une huitaine d’annees, il
semble que le probleme de la connaissance ait cesse d’occuper
la premiere place dans la pens4e de M. Dewey, II parait
11
s’int^resser d’abord principalement aux questions morales."
Dewey himself declared this in his Outlines of a Critical
Theory of Ethics (1891).
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3ven though there may not he a conscious effort in
the shifting of his interest in his research, there 'is an in-
ternal demand for the transition from a psychological study of
the individual to a study of the moral behavior of the individual,
and thence to his "mental" activities; thinking and reasoning
and grasping of meaning, which occur in social experience.
Sunning the "risk" of encountering the conservative and theo-
logical pov/er, Dev/ey gave more attention to the study of Darv/in,
and was more convinced hy his logic. Hence, his reduction of
the normative sciences and the physical sciences to biology.
In other words, biological categories are applied to normative
sciences the fundamental principle of pragmatism. 5’inally his
diverse interests came to a crystalization in his Democracy and
Education .
3. The ideal of his interest the recovery and recon-
struction of philosophy.
Since the publication os this book Dewey has felt
the demand for the practical functioning of philosophy in civi-
lization and has set for himself a great task. First he claimed
the need for a recovery of philosophy and then a reconstruction
of it. The means for accomplishing this demands a new type of
logic. Before the revision can precede, we must be "willing"
to abandon most of the traditional problems of philosophy, since
they have lost their relevancy. The most crucial problem is
the revision of the conception of experience, for Dewey holds
that the recovery of philosophy v/ill take place only when the
nev/ conception of experience replaces the old. His new concep-
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tion or formulation of experience has stimulated thought and
<5ha-llenged students of philosophy. However, his thought since
1904 has been developing in two directions; on the practical side
he has stressed "social significance"; on the theoretical side,
he has oeen laboring to fill the "gaps" in his system; namely,
cosmology and the subjects of this sharable objective world.
For example, take the title of his recent work, Hxperience and
Mature. The synthesis of these two aspects is found in his
philosophy of civilization.
4. Philosophy as a critique of civilization.
V
To maintain the moral values of civilization,
according to Dewey, depends upon the insight and decision of
the individual, who is provided with a definite and controllable
tool. Dev^ey calls this tool, science in the general sense.
Philosophy as a general logic of experience is to apply this
tool, wrestling with the problem of life whereby a new tech-
nique to control inquiry may be engendered and a methodic con-
trol of experience may be realized.
In the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy
Dewey showed "the role of philosophy in the history of civiliza-
tion", and made "a plea for casting off of that intellectual
timidity which hampers the wings of imagination, a plea for
speculative audacity, for more faith in ideas, for sloughing
off a cowardlt reliance upon those partial ideas to which we
12
are wont to give the name of facts." This increasing emphasis
on the mission of philosophy in civilization may be seen in the
chapter which he contributed to Charles Beard’s ^.Thither Mankind,
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'•A Critique of American Civilization" in The ’t7orId Tomorrov/
13
(Octoher 1928), and in his report bn Russia,
3, Outstanding Cha.racteristics of Dewey’s Thought,
The titles of Dewey’s writings may be taken as a
good manifestation of the outstanding characteristics of his
thought. They may be classified under four heads: educational
and psychological, social and political, ethical and logical,
experience-philosophy. To give an adequate detailed analysis
of them is not only out of place here but also impossible with-
in the limited space. Therefore, we cannot expect more than
a brief summary, pointing out the outstanding characteristics
under the four categories just named,
1, Educational and psychological.
One of the ablest works of Dewey is his Democracy
and Education
,
which is, as indicated by the subtitle, an
introduction to the philosophy of education. One of the great
tasks which Dewey has taken the responsibility to do is seen
over and over again--the bridging over of the historical dual-
isms, He says, "At the outset, the rise of modern science
I
prophesied a restoration of the ultimate connection of nature
and humanity", and the educational scheme of studies based on
an evolution of knowledge "are designed to overcome the separa-
tion and to secure recognition of the place occupied by the
14
subject matter of natural sciences in hiunan affairs," The
stage prior to this, possibly more important than this, is the
intimacy of individual and society, for he says. "social ef-
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ficiency as an education purpose should mean cultivation of
power to join freely and fully in shared or common activities.”
The life of society, lihe that of the individual, precedes by
constant renewals. V/hen society is constituted of individuals
of worth, when they freely and intelligently share activities,
there is social efficiency and democracy. 'This may be said
to be the culmination of his psychological and ethical interest.
2. Social and political.
In every subject to which Dewey turns he seems
to confront a dualism; a dichotomy within continuous experience.
In his examination of society and the state he finds this same
situation, for he says, "If one wishes to realize the distance
which may lie betv/een "facts" and the meaning of facts, let
16
one go to the field of social discussion." "In any event,
social philosophy exhibits an immence gap between facts and
17
doctrines." Dewey’s political philosophy may be summarized
under a few principles. First, the community and its interests
are not to be identified with the state or the politically or-
ganized coiiimunity. "And the differentiation may dispose us to
look with more favor upon the proposition already advanced: namely,
that the line between private and public is to be dravm on the
basis of the extent and scope of the consequences of acts which
are so important as to need control, whether by inhibition or
18
by promotion." if there is any consistency in Dewey’s thought,
one of the examples is his functional theory of everything( in
the true pragmatic fashion). He says, "The v/ords ’government’
and ’officers’ are taicen functionally, not in terms of some
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particular structure which is so familiar to us that it leaps
19
to our eyes when these words are used." His conception of
the State is pluralistic. Aga,in in the pragmatic form, Dewey
tried to find the condition of a Great Society to be transform-
ed into a Great Community: a face-to-face, free and shared in-
tercourse. This suggests Royce’s ideal of the "Great Community".
3. Ethics and logic.
The close relation between ethics, psychology,
and logic brought out by Dev/ey is a distinct contribution. The
key to the understanding of the socia-1 psychology is the under-
standing of habit; the key to the understanding of individual
psychology, the operation of impulse and intelligence. "Mind
can be understood in the concrete only as a system of beliefs,
desires, and purposes which are formed in the interaction of
20
biological aptitudes with a social environment." The process
of this interaction is chiefly the process of thought, and the
meaning of experience. Therefore, his logic is called ’experi-
mental’ in the sense that it is an empirical and psychological
description of human activity in its concrete adaptation and
control. of the environment. "Personal culture" and "socia.1
efficiency" are possible because of the fact that man is not
only highly adapted, but also adaptable and the ’objective world’
has a certain form of crude organization like that of experience,
which ’carries v/ith it organization’. Lotze, the earliest fore-
runner of pragmatic tendency in central Europe, says that life
is deeper than logic. Though Dewey is more influenced by Dar-
winian biology and evolutionary method, the fundamental pra.gmatic
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principle is there. ’;7hen life is interpreted in its highest
expression, the person or personality, we have persona,listic
pragmatism, represented by Jaraes and Bov/ne; when it is inter-
preted merely in terms of biological organism, we have natural-
istic pragmatism, Dewey’s philosophy. “To make our ideals clear"
is for "action", hence logic and ethics.
4. licperience-philosophy.
Dewey’s philosophy may be called experience-philo
sophy for these reasons: First, the recovery and reconstruction
of philosophy depends upon the new conception of experience;
second, any theory of reflection must appeal to experience for
its verification and judgment; third, the method of Dewey’s
philosophy is called (by himself) the "method of experience" or
the "experience method"; fourth, it is in his theories of ex-
perience that Dev^ey has established a "new" system of thought.
G. Dewey’s Philosophical System.
By the "system" of a philosophy or philosopher we
mean the complete systematic treatment of the main philosophical
problems. ITo matter^philo sophical position or attitude one
takes, he is bound to have "some" methodology, which includes
logic and epistemology; "some" metaphysics, the analytical side
of which is "the study of the basic categories of science"--
ontology, and the synthetic side of which is the formulation
of- a unified picture of the world--cosmology; "some" theory of
value, which includes ethics, "the study of the good and of the
\
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means of realizing it in conduct", and esthetics, "the study of
21
the beautiful and of the means of rea^lizing it in art", V/e
believe it is safe to sa,y that in one way or another a thinker
will manifest these interests in his reflection if he professes
to philosophize at all.
To philosophize is not merely to produce definitions
of philosophy and catalogue philosophical problems, but "to seek
to translate the implicit conviction of order into explicit in-
sight, to show that the lesson of experience, taken comprehensive-
ly in range but with the best of each type as the clue to inter-
pretation, yields and sustains this insight," Dewey will cer-
tainly agree to this statement, for he himself has said that
"philosophy is inherently criticism, having its distinctive posi-
tion among various modes of criticism in its generality; a cri-
23
ticism of criticisms, as it were," In the process of criticism,
especially in its "generality", we are aiming at "instituting
24
and perpetuating more enduring and extensive values." The
non-reflective experience gives the data or problems for philoso-
phy, the discipline which provides a critique of experience,
Dewey is right when he says that "philosophic discourse partakes
both of scientific ajid literary discourse", for "it is a comment
on nature and life in the interest of a more intense and just
25
appreciation of the meanings present in experience," In other
words, it is a "translation" from "implicit order" into "explicit
insight", Dewey sometimes calls this transformation "methodic
26
control of experience,"
In presenting Dev/ey’s thought in a concise system, we
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snail follow Monta.gue’s division of philosophy; methodology,
metaphysics, and the theory, of value.
1. Methodology.
Dev/ey, in discussing philosophic method, says
that there are two "avenues" of approach to the goal of philosophy.
One of them is to begin v/ith "experience in gross"; the other,
from the "refined selective products". He adapts the former
approach, which requires an empirical method. This method aims
to find out the "v/hen", the "where", and the "hov;» of the diverse
interacting elements of the v/orld. The logic of this, then, is
"evolutionary" and "experimental".
Dev/ey caught the insight and "significance" of
Lotze (his peculiar effort to combine a transcendental viev/ of
thought with certain obvious facts of the dependence of our
thought upon specific empirical antecedents), and set to develop
his "instrumentalism" whereby "logical terras and distinctions"
may be viewed with respect to "neoeasary function in the
redintegration of experience". Is there anything new thus
far? The answer is negative, for all philosophies claim the
same function snd purpose of their methods. The uniqueness of
Dewey's position lies in his "revision" of terminology, "limita-
tion" of thought functions, and the elimination of obsolete notions
in philosophy.
2. Metaphysics.
Logic, according to Dewey, must come to terms
with psychology, for the latter affords a natural history of
thinking as a life-process. This interpretation of logic in
terns of psychology is in agreement with his naturalistic meta-
f >
ijj
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physics. Sellars points out that the weakness of empiricism
has been the umvillingness to develop a systematic metaphysics
but the instrumentalist pragmatism is a more broadly conceived
28
naturalism. Since the publication of Sellars* book ( Evolu-
tionary ITaturalism, 1922) Dewey has made more of a plea for
metaphysics and has given more attention to augmenting and
29
developing his own metaphysical principles.
The foundations of a naturalistic metaphysics may be
su:imarized under six headings:
a. nature of existence: "Contingency" is one of the
predominant traits of the universe, for the world is a vital
mixture of tight completeness and uncertain possibilities, order
and indeterrainateness. Therefore, the principle of relativity
is significant for a naturalistic me^taphysics. But since every
existence is a natural event the relativism becomes objective.
b. Process 'and structure: Experience is history;
reality is the growth-process. "To designate the slower and
the regular rhythmic events structure, and more rapid and irre-
30
gular ones process, is sound practical sense," Order and
structure are the intellectual constructions, which have a re-
gulative and instnimental function.
c. Events and objects: Every existence is an event
which is self-sufficient. Objects are precisely what we are
aware of, i.e,, events with meanings. Events are endings whether
enjoyed or obnoxious; they are not rigid lumpy substance, but
"ongoing" and as such, they are "unfinished, incomplete, and in-
31
determinate", "We do not name an immediate event" because
32
"that is impossible."
,
But they "are present and operative any-
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way ... .Events have effects and consequences anyway...." V/hen
they have no attributed meanings, they are either accidents or
34
catastrophes." "Although talking is itself an event, we can-
35
not talk events. 7/e can only talk meanings."
However, when characters are assigned, events or
36
"mere occurrences" are converted into "implications". They
are converted "by means of inference as to their probable conse-
quences", and"these are the meanings imputed to the events under
37
consideration."
.Then events are turned into objects, "they
may be referred to when they do not exist..." Objects imply
38
at once the original existence and an inner experimentation.
"Event" has become a crucial problem in contempor-
ary philosophy, and has gained many followers. '.Thitehead and
Dewey are the leading prophets. Dewey again generously acknow-
ledges (in a private conversation) his indebtedness to ’.Thitehead
for his interest in the problem just mentioned; therefore it is
beneficial to malce a brief comparison between them:
Dewey:
'.Thitehead:
Denial of the presupposition: Ultimate
incompatibility of objectivity and ul-
timate relativity—39
Opposition to "hypostazation" and "bi-
furcation"
.
1. Hature: Reality and experience
come to be the same thing. Ex-
perience affords justification
for every happening in this rela- '
,
tive world. "This human situation
falls wholly within nature." 40
^1. ITature: "Hature is thus a to-
tality including individual ex-
periences, so that we must re-
ject the distinction between
nature as it really is and ex-
perience of it which are pure-
ly psychological. Our experiences
of the apparent world are na-
ture itself." 41
"This common world is a complex
of things, including all ex-
periences." 42
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2. Events: "Events, being events
and not rigid lumpy substances,
are ongoing..." 43 "Every exist-
ence is an event... The eventful
character of all existences is
no reason for consigning them 44
to the realm of mere appearance.."
"Each successive event being a
stage in a serial process is both
expectant and commemorative." 45
2. Events; "Every event extends
over other events, and every e-
vent is extended over by other
events." 46 Events are the very
stuff of our experiences; they
"are lived through ; they extend
around us; they are the medium
within which our physical ex-
perience develops." 47
"In every event there
is something obdurate, self-
sufficient, v/holly immediate...
irreducible, infinitely_ plural, 48
undefinable, and indescribable."
"The same existential
events are capable of an infinite
ni^ber of meanings .... since possi-
bilities of conjunction are end-
less, and since the consequences
of any of them may at some time
be significant, its potential
meanings are endless." 50
"^\ny act is petty in
comparison with the totality of
natural events .Yet "in a
genuine sense every act is al-
ready possessed of infinite im-
port... The little part of the
. scheme of affairs... is continu-52
ous with the rest of the world."
"The salvation of
reality is its obstinate, irre-
ducible, matter-of-fact entities,
which are limited to be no other
than themselves...." 49
"ITothing in nature
could be what it is except as an
ingredient in nature as it is...
An isolated event is not an event,
because every event is a factor
in a larger whole and is signi-
ficant of that whole." 51
3. Objects: "Events turn into o-jects, things with meaning. " 53
>7hen "events come to possess
characters, they are demarcated
and noted. " 54
"Existence is not a
character of objects, but objects
are chara^cters of existence, of
events." 57
3. Objects: "’Significance' is the
relatedness of things." 55 "Sach
eternal obj ec t has its own proper
connection wioh each.
... occasion,
which I term its mode of ingressioninto that occasion." 56
.
"ICnowledge issues from
this reciprocal insistence betv/een
this event and the rest of nature,
namely relations are perceived inthe making and because of the mak-ing...." 58
"Events acquire mean-ings" and meanings occur within
nature." liTeanings are acquired
through communication. 59
...
"That how an actual
entity :becomes constitutes what
that actual i^; so that the~ twodescriptions of an actual entity
are not independent. Its being is
constituted by its becoming." 60
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There are "modes of interaction’*
through interaction, "events have
coraraunicable meanings ... capable of
connotation and denotation." 61
l.Ieanings are objective because they
are natural interaction. 62
4. Time and Space; "'.Then it is a 4, Time and Space: "Event (in a
question of critical search for sense) are space and time, name
valid meaning.. the genuine meaning ly space and time are abstrac-
of events... we are obliged to have tions from events. But objects
recourse to antecedent conditions,
"total histories or immanental
temporal wholes." 63
"Reality is growth-pro-
cess itself ;.... The real exist-
ence is the history in its en-
tirety,...." 65 "Experience is
history. . .Anything denoted is
found to have temporal quality
and reference; it has movement
from and towards within it;
it is marlced by waxings and
v/anings. The translation of
temporal quality into an order
of time is an intellectual
arrangement..." 66
"To designate the slower
and the regular rhthymic events
structure, and more rapid and
irregular one process, is sound
practical sense. It expresses
the function of one in respect o
the other."
.are only derivatively in space
and time by reason of their
relation to events." 64
It is "in our know-
ledge" that events "differentia^te
themselves into space-relations
and time-relations .... space and
time are each partial expressions
of one fundamental relation be-
tween events which is neither
spatial nor temporal. This rela-
tion I call extension." 67
Serial time is the re-
sult of "an intellectual process
of abstraction," not the very
passage of nature itself." 69
"We observe nature as extended in
aui immediate present v/hich is 70
simultaneous but not instantajieous'.'
"That such agreement is possible between two major philo-
sophers with such different antecedents and such widely separated
fields of inquiry, is itself no small recommendation for the prin-
71
ciples which both have been led to adopt."
d. Meanings and ends: Interaction and communication are
essential to meanings. "The same existential events a.re capable
72
of an infinite number of meanings." Dewey holds that events
, 73
acquire meanings and that meanings occur within nature. Here
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we see the need of both evolutionary naturalism ejid objective
relativism.
e. Causality and teleology: Dewey seems to be in
agreement with Hume that causality cannot be made intelligible
except as it is defined as "afaother name for the sequential order
74
of a. history." Ultimate teleology is openly denied by Dewey.
3nds are either ends-in-view or fulfillments of natural events.
f. Mind and consciousness; Mind is one of the ends
of nature, being the highest development of the levels of nature.
"Mind is contextual and persistent; consciousness is focal and
transitive. Mind is, so to speak, structural, substantial; a
constant background and foreground; perceptive consciousness is
process, a series of heres and nows. Mind is a constant luminos-
ity; consciousness intermittent, a series of flashes of varying
75
intensities."
3. Theory of value:
a. Ethics: Philosophy in some sense is a branch of
morals, in the thought of Dewey. Any criticism implies a theory
of value and philosophy is inherently a "criticism of criticisms"
•76
Therefore philosophy is " transvaluation of values".
In accordance with his interest in establishing the
continuity of experience, Dewey refuses to make a distinction
between instrumental and intrinsic values. The possibility of
the realization of values, according to Dewey, lies in the con-
nection of the actual and the ideal, theory and practice. To
establish this connection he seems to feel that one must keep
his feet on the "solid" ground, so as not to be led away by the
r -I
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moral judgment ttberhaupt. Only the” situation within which the
categories emerge and function can furnish the basis for esti-
77
mation of their value and import,” Any realization of value
requires a social situation, the ^reciprocal determination* of
the judger and the content judged. And this again leads us to
the logical conclusion that "since the judger is personal, the
content judged must be ultimately personal too so that the
moral judgment really institutes a relationship between per-
78
sons, relationship between persons being v/hat we mean by ’social'”,
79
"Morals means growth of conduct in meaning...”
The "ought” and the "is” are not to be separated, for the "ought”
80
is the "is” of action, Dewey never forgets his ' intelligence '
J
It is intelligence which opens up the possibilities and guides
the activities toward the "ought to be”. The "ought to be" is,
moreover, the "larger and fuller” activity tov/ard which the "is”,
81
carrying v/ith it all the past deposits, strives,
b. Esthetics: Dewey agrees with the Greek view that
the fine arts and industrial technologies are affairs of prac-
tice, Science is an art; art is practice. This is also a- modem
tendency. Some modes of practice are not intelligent, and not
inherently and immediately enjoyable while others are full of
enjoyed meanings. In connection with this interpretation Dewey
concludes that art is the complete culmination of nature while
science is the "handmaiden” that leads na-tural events to this
issue. If this is accepted, the principle of continuity is es-
tablished: division of everything into nature and experience, of
experience into practice and theory, art and science, of art into
useful and fine, "mental ajid free” will be rendered superficial
82
and disappear.
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A word more alaout experience and art, When the relation
of these two is properly understood, the continuity of the artis-
tic and the esthetic will he established. Nature is partial and
incomplete; it becomes fully itself through wha,t Dewey calls
"operative art". Crude existence is meaningless until it is
translated into meaningful objects. Translation is arrived at
by intentional direction (v/ill and intellect) operating upon
the immediately given, 7/hen the objects of conscious experience
are "reflectively chosen", there can be a union of the precarious
83
novel, irregular with the settled, assured, and uniform. This
union also defines the artistic and the esthetic,
c. Ethics and esthetics: In both ethics and esthetics
Dewey denies the notion of ultimate teleology, but he cleverly
formulates a postulate of sensing the "tendency", without which
there is neither morality nor appreciation. Moral theory is
action in idea, from the "idea" to the "ought". Art as an active
process includes nor merely the esthetic perceotion but also the
84
"social significance" of the esthetic object. Ethics and
esthetics then are intentional and directional processes function
ing as criticisms of values!
-rr/.-
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Chapter II
THE ORIGIIT AMD GRO'vTH OE HIS THEORY OE EXPERIENCE
It is almost a platitude to say that no philosophic
system is independent and original in the absolute sense, A
genius may make startling contributions and give unique ex-
pressions or articul8,tions to the meaning of life ajid the view
of the universe, but his position cannot in any sense be viewed
as an isolated production. History of thought, like ajiy other
history, is a continuous process. This idea has been more
clearly brought out in modern philosophy than in any earlier
period,
A new formulation of any philosophical concept may
be a development of the past, either immediate or remote, or
a revolt from the past. But "we are the heir of all ages in
our intellectual life, and so can utilize the results of those
1
who have gone before us," Even though we may understand
different schools of thought without much difficulty and without
acknowledging them, every point of view is at some period of
history a hard-won acquisition. There also may be many schools
of philosophy of history, but the continuity of historical pro-
cesses is recognized by all. In other words, there seems to be
an temal dialectic movement in the history of thought. In the
course of life and experience there may be shifting of attention,
and interest, and transplantation of emphasis, and new discoveries
and improvements; and thus we find progress. The philosophy of any
thinker, therefore, may be said to be composed of "ingredients".
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Dewey’s thought is no exception. Before v/e take his unique posi-
tion concerning experience, let us try to state his historical
indebtedness or philosophical heritage.
In 8. private discussion Professor said that "very definite-
ly" he owes a great deal to Hegel through G, S. Morris of Johns
Hopkins University. It is by. Hegel, according to Dewey, that
the 8. priori and the a posteriori are connected. Idee is process,
but the process of thought. Here is what Dewey has been laboring
to improve. The Hegelian principle of the synthesis^ of the dia-
lectic is a bridging over of the separation between thesis and
antithesis. Idee is a process, to which Dewey applies the evo-
lutionary concepts inste'ad of intellec tualistic formulations.
Here again I may venture to interpret his statement made in a
private discussion that he caught the spirit of the renaissance
going back to the classics. There Dewey saw the value of the
Platonic Ideas not as "ideas in themselves" but as intrumentalities
of "social dignif ic'ance. " This, without doubt, is the origin of
his intriunentalism. Social application ’of the Platonic ideas
and the establishment of continuity in the "concrete universal"
give the kernel of his v/hole system of thought. The industrial
and social characteristics of the age, his training in pedagogical
2
psychology under Stanley Hall, and the opportunity of developing
an experimental philosophy as the Head of the Department of Philo-
sophy and Pedagogy at the University of Ghiacgo all contribute
to the development of Dewey’s pragmatic trend of thought. The
inner logical development of Dewey’s thought necessarily culminates
in a philosophy of experience.
h'
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V/henever the motive of an act or of a theory is detected,
the meaning of the act or theory will he more clearly understood.
Hence to trace Dewey’s motive in the formulation of his theory
of experience is essential to the understanding of its meaning.
A. Problems Which Dewey Intends to Solve.
The world may be "the best possible" world,- but it is
far from being a perfect one. This, then, at once seems to take
the stand against the mechanistic conception of the world. There
are always problems, and as 'soon as the problems are recognized
or felt, there are attempted solutions. Hew solutions always in
thm give rise to new problems. Hence, one can either be an
optimist or a pessimist, for the situation may be at once viewed
as progress and the very nature of lifei or as meaning struggle,
V/hichever view one may take, the "eventful character of existence",
to use Dewey’s words, is "there"; Lei us take an optimistic
view for the present. Heeds sharpen our witsJ Problems and
demands give occasions for progress.
The place of the Christian Church in Western civiliza^
tion is a good example. Under the Roman government the world was
uniformly ruled by good protection, fine roads, prosperous trade,
and well-defined law, but there emerged a crying need for eman-
cipation from mere solidarity, V/hen there is too rigid social
solidarity, there follows a reactionary demand for the expression
of individuality. Then the Christians through persecution
taught individuality. After the sack of Hone in 310 A.D. by the
Goths, who knew how to hunt and hov/ to fight, but not hov/ to work
together, the imperative need was transferred to social solidarity
ry
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again. Tlie Christian Church in turn hecane the social center,
teaching agriculture and giving education and training in co-
operation. After the Church finally gained supreme pov/er and
became highly institutionalized the Reformation came as the reply
c
to a dem-and for the recognition of the individual. ^e are not
in a position to say that this indicate an infinite alternation
of individual and social emphasis, “but that the pro'blem- solution
is one of the v/ays of viewing the continuity of history and ex-
perience.
ITow, intellec tualism and idealism were in command of
the philosophical world both in England and in America before
1870. Since then there have been three movements in operation,
with one predominant purpose; namely, revolution against intel-
lectualism and absolutism. These three movements are pragmatism,
realism, and personal idealism. Dewey joined the camp of the
first, and established a school of thought hnov/n as the Chicago
3 •
•
School.
Dewey shows in the "Introduction" to Essays in Experi -
mental Logic that whenever philosophy goes so far as to become
’vicious intellectualism’ there is or should be a return to
"appeal to experience" for emancipation. "It was an emphatic asser-
tion that until men could see how things got into belief, and
what they did v/hen they got there, intellectual acceptance would
.4
be withheld." This is the spirit true to the general tendencies
of modern philosophy since Kauit. The philosophy of history in
Italy, the creative evolution in France, "personality" philosophy
and realism in Scotland, the huraa.nism of Schiller, the creative
Ai
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experience of James, and the personal experience of Eowne; all
of these are philosophies' of experience. Dev/ey sees clearly
that it is the duty of the empirical philosopher ’’to fix the im-
port of mathematical and logical pretensions'* by most vigorously
"insisting upon the necessity of reference to experience." 3y
way of contrast and comparison, we may briefly indicate the mo-
tives of James and Eovme. The former, following Henouvier, en-
,
t
deavored to establish pluralism, i.e. the will to believe in the
"each-form" of reality and to reach real possibilities of experi-
ence. In other words, he aims at freedom of will, democracy of
beings, and rationality of all phases of human experience. "In
the same footsteps", Bo'^e, following Lotze and Ulrici formulates,
as the "first of the clan", personalism. In that there is room
for the positivistic view of science and the metaphysical view
of philosophy. For both James and Bowne experience is "uncondi-
tionally trustworthy", though its present form is not final and
all. Defining theism, however, seems to be the major emphasis.
Dewey, on the one hand, follows the same Kantian trend
of thought and carries out the principle of the primacy of the
practical reason. On the other hand, he emphasizes the genetic
method and maintains the naturalistic position, where he holds
that the formal and the material, the theoretical and the prac-
tical, and the actual and the ideal become connected.
Dewey says, "Let me say that reference to experience •
seems at present to be the easiest way of realizing the contin-l .
uities among subject-matters that are alv/ays getting split up
6
into dualisms." This manifests, then, one of the motives of
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experience-pliilosophyj that is, it brings about continuity and
fills the gap of dualism. Dewey, in looking over the outline
of this investigation, said that the stress laid upon continuity
was a good interpretation of his motive. The logical question
will be what are the dualisms which he intends to bridge over.
1, The historical problems of dualism.
Svery.vhere Dewey turns in the history of thought
he seems to find the ghost of dualism staring at him; therefore
in his :ihcperimental Logic he says in effect that his motive in
making a new formulation of experience is to show the fallacious
grounds of historical dualisms and to establish their continuity,
a. The real and the ideal; The first and outstand-
ing dualism is the separation of the actual from the ideal. It
is with reference to this dualism that Dewey emphatically and
repeatedly says, "(Jod only knows how many of the sufferings of
life are due to a belief that the natural scene a.nd operations
of our life are lacking in ideal import, and to the consequent
tendency to flee, for the lack of ideal factors, to some other
7
world inhabited exclusively by idea,ls«" This separation is '
naturally suicidal to experience. Hov/ever, Dev/ey is conscious
of the fact that this separation has a more fundamental ground
than it appears to have. The separation of the "v/orld of essences"
from the "world of natural existences" is a technical matter.
It is a discouraging practice because it generates "countless"
problems rather than solves them.
Pragmatism is often criticized as being ’opportunistic’,
”/hen old ways of thinking lose their freslmess and usefulness.
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they are to he abandoned. The here and the now are the only im-
perative questions with which philosophy ought to deal. This
certainly expresses Dewey’s position, for he says "Better it is
for iDhilosophy to err in active participation in the living strug-
gles and issues of its ovm age and times than to maintain an im-
mune monastic impecability, without relevancy and bearing in the
8
generating ideas of its contemporary present."
He, therefore, holds tha.t ideals are the possibilities
of natural events and to effect this consummation is to point
out the continuity and interaction of the various attitudes and
9
interests in experience as the readiest way to-day. Experience
is the field, the fertile field where both real and ideal are
produced and cultivated. It is in activity that the real and the
ideal are connected. "V/hen we talce means for ends we indeed
fall in moral materialism. But when we take ends vmthout regard
10
to means we degenerate into sentimentalism." In discussing
the connection of the real and the ideal, Dewey in a later pass-
age points out very clearly the difference between the traditional
view and the modern, ‘./hen men undergo troubles they are forced to
project pictures of a better state of things. The modern view
is that the ideal must be shaped so that it may become an ins-
trument for action, instead of being, as the traditional view
would have it, a ready-made pattern in a noumenal world, for
11
mere contemplation. Here we must agree with Dewey that philo-
sophy can no longer be merely contemplative, but must be operative.
This emphasis is true to human experience, which is characterized
by activity. Of course, activity, as Dewey elsev/here points out,
, .7
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is not merely iDlind movements, but the clearing up of ideas, the
suggesting of best possibilities-, and the reaching of direction
and control. One of the forms, possibly one of the hardest forms
of activity is the negative form of it. Self-control is an ex-
ample. Here is one of the significant occasions where Dewey is
proposing to overthrov/ the "vain metaphysics" and "idle epistemo-
12
logy" and is turning his energy to a critique of civilization.
b. Sensationalism and rationalism; As a result of the
separation of the real and the ideal v/e find sensationalism on
the one hand and rationalism on the other. In spite of his opposi-
tion to Kant, Dewey recognizes the contribution of Kant, for he
says, "Students of philosophy v/ill recognize what I mean when I
say that this growing conviction of futility and consequent dis-
taste are associated v/ith the outcome of the famous dictum of
Kant that perception without conception is blind, v/hile conception
13
without perception is empty. The sensationalist has therefore
v/orked out only the latter part of the phrase; the rationalist, the
former part. Sensation and thought come to oppose each other
more rigidly than ever before. The modern thinkers began to make
experience the final court of appeal; hence sensationalism became
dominant, to the neglect of accounting for the intrinsic sense,
a.ctive, and emotional phases. On the other hand, both the con-
tinental rationalists and the British empiricists make the same
mistake; namely, they make experience purely cognitive, or a pro-
blem of knowledge. Dewey says, "It is the continual running up
against this situation which accounts for the fla.gging of inter-
est and the desire to direct energy where it v/ill have more out-
14
come." His strenuous effort to get away from a rigid system
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either of sensationalism or rationalism is clear. One of the
characteristics v/ith which Dewey labels himself is "active", for
in action, sensation and thought are connected, as both factors
are necessary in action; "one stands for stimulus, for initiative;
15
the other for control, for direction." His ideal, then, is to
make experience primarily practical, a matter of doing and under-
going the consequences of doing and to malce of reason, instead
of a remote ideal faculty, the resources for the fruitful raean-
16
ings of activity.
Activity, to Dev/ey, means the vital and practical
life-process. And "when experience is aligned with the life-pro-
cess, and sensations are seen to be points of readjustment, the
alleged atomism of sensations totally disappears. With this dis-
appearance is abolished the need for a synthetic faculty of supra-
empirical reason to connect them The true ’stuff’ of experience
is recognized to be adaptive course of actions, habits, active
functions, connections of doings and undergoing; sensori-motor
17
co-ordinations." ICnov/ledge gets its significance in relating
18
knowing and. doing, theorising and practising. The significant
factors brought out by both the sensationalist and the rationalist
are not to be neglected for they constitute social and practical
life. The former shows the demand for freedom for personal ini-
tiation into experience, for variety and progress; the la.tter,
for general order, for continuous and organized unity, for the
19
conservation of the dearly bought resources of the past. This
again indicates instrumentalistic pragmatism. Dewey says that
Kantian epistemology is on the right track, but stops short when
•rr
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it defines percept and elaborates the concept and fails to show
20
their union in action.
c. The a priori and the a posteriori; Kext we have the
problem of a priori and a posteriori. There are, according to
Dewey, two inconsistent interpretations of a priori thought; first,
that of talcing the "a priori worth of thought in a. regulative,
directive, controlling sense, thought as consciously, intentional-
21
ly making an experience different in a determinate sense and manner";
and second, that of taking the "a priori... as something which is
already immanent in any experience, ajid which accordingly maJkes
no determinate difference to any one experience as compared v/ith
22
any other, or with any past or future form of itself." This
contrast comes mainly as the result of the position of Kant,
who holds to the former sense when he compares his philosophy
with the introduction of construction into geometry and experimenta-
tion into physics and chemistry, but takes the latter sense when
he answers Hume, Dewey says that this again is' due to the mis-
conception or "vibrating between" two definitions of concept;
first, a concept is to be defined as a rule of constructive syn-
thesis in a differential sense; second, it is to be defined as
a static endovmient lurking in ’mindS and giving automatically
a hard and fixed la,w for the determina^tion of every experienced
object, Careful readers of Dewey will notice that he is not
attacking Kant’s position of the a priori^ but that he is aiming
at the emphasis of the regulative and preferential aspects of
thought. To support this position, we have two statements from
Dewey, In the first place he says that the first of the meanings
of the a priori "is intelligible a-nd marks a definite contribu-
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tion to the logic of science.” In the second meaning Dewey
agrees v/ith Kant that "organization of some sort exists in every
experience.” It is also clear that "reference to some prior
existential mode of organization" is necessary. "And it seems
equally clear that reflection goes on v/ith profit only because
the materials with v/hich it deals have always already some degree
24
of organization, or exemplify various relationships." Here our
task is no more than to bring out the dualisms v/hich Dewey aims
to connect and to dissolve. \7e shall have occasion for a more
extended evaluation and comparison of Dev/ey’s thought with that
of Kant.
d. Perceptual data and conceptual thought; In the same
essay Dewey has shov/n another aspect of dua^lism, the separation
of the conceptual thought from the perceptual data. In the first
place, there is a fundamental ambiguity in the term perception
as it is in a priority. Perception and conception cannot be made
antithetical because the former "may itself be surcharged v/ith
any amount of imaginatively supplied and reflectively sustained
ideal factors", and the latter has its content by "affectional
25
and intentional contexts." The intentional and emotional
elements are excluded only v/hen they are taken as "scientific obser
vation", where abstraction comes in and observation is set over
26
against thought "deliberately, purposely, and artfully."
Dewey says that he is part indebted to Plato for
his instrumentalism. Plato makes a. distinction of perceptioha.l
and conceptional thought or idea in a "perceptive experience" a,nd
uses the latter as 'an instrument for logical control. Thus far
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Dewey agrees heartily. But when Plato identifies the idea with
27
all experience j ne parts coripPJiy. The distinction of perceptual
data and conceptual thought, then, is a practical one.
Some other dualisms y/hich have been criticized by
Dewey deserve mention. Por instance, the dualism of appearance
and reality
,
the dualism of body and mind, of phenomena ajid nouriienaj
all these he definitely denies.
2. To bring about continuity.
In the last section we have seen more of the his-
torical dualisms and the motives for bridging them over than of
the positive formulation for establishing continuity. We believe
it is in place to malce a snort revievir of the notion of continuity
in the history of thought before turning directly to Dewey’s
contribution.
A. Taylor summarises the notion of continuity in
humc^in history and divides it into three stages: First, the pre-
scientific stage. The notion of continuity was nothing more than
a simple description of certain obvious facts of sense-experience".
In 7/estern thought, we go back to the Greeks. having
nothing between, presenting no sensible gap, hanging together;
oi 7^ building without a gap; C'vv't^iTs
non-remitting fevers; uninterrupted address.
All of these are simple and single experiences, without color
from scientific reflection.
Then we have the Pythagorean mathematics and later
tne views of Plato and Aristotle. The interesting note is the
criticism upon the Pythagoreans inflicted by the Bleatics, that
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is, the sharp distinction between niunber ’ collection of
units an continuous magnitude which has no unit or minumi^
After Plato and Aristotle, there emerged a connection between
the notion of number and that of series.
Third, the modern tendency. The only distinction from
that of the Ancient Greeks is that the modern thought, after
Leibniz, has made more out of the principle of continuity as
fundamental not only for mathematics, but also for metaphysics.
28
The characteristics of the notion as a whole are intellec tualistic
.
In the history of the philosoph^’^ of the recent pa^st,
over against intellec tualistic absolute realism and absolute
idealism we have the pragmatic and the personalistic movements.
These movements, having their root in Kant, establish the .con-
tinuity of experience through a synthesis of the two critiques
of reason. In the former critique we have the "regulative ideas
of the reason, whose truth and worth is resolved into their
scientific and experimental fruitfulness" and in the latter
critique, "the postulates of the practical reason whose truth
and worth is resolved into their actual and ethical fruitfulness in
29
the domain of life and action."
Dewey has seen the significance of this synthesis, and
has applied it in the biological and evolutionary interpretation
of experience, thus limiting a metaphysical interpretation of ex-
perience in its spiritualistic and theistic form to a somewhat
naturalistic one, in a humanistic form. Following the empirical
spirit of Dev/ey, we shall examine his actual statements concerning
the problem and let the continuity of experience as expressed in
his philosophy be denoted, instead of making logical deductions
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from his position, liixperience is the best and final appeal for
the notion of continuity, for "experience ca,rries principles of
30
connection and organization within itself." In other words,
experience is the ever-active process of becoming, the on-going
of oontinuity. It is true that Dewey is not fully satisfied with
the "elan vital", but the dissatisfaction comes from other associ-
ations with Bergson's position rather than from this principle
itself. A comparison of Dewey with Bergson at this point is out
of place. Dewey says that the principles of connection and organ-
ization in experience are "vital and practical" rather "epistemo-
logical". Experience is vital and practical because life manifests
itself in its spontaneity and impulses. Intelligence Dewey maices
the instrument or medium for bringing about organization and con-
tinuity, for smoothing over rough junctures of the on-going of
life, whereas Bergson holds that the intellectual arrest of
reality is not reality. in its spontaneous and continuous on-going.
One may characterize Dewey’s position, in opposition to Bergson’s
anti-intellec tualism, as intellectualistic
.
a. The continuity of diverse and interacting elements:
Dewey says that he uses the word experience ra.ther than world or
environment because it suggests more than either of them... Ex-
perience "means just such an immence and objective world of diverse
and interacting elements" and " suggests .... an actual focusing of
31
the world at one point of i/ruaediate shining apparency." In
connection with this allusion v/e find two problems; namely, the
problem of interaction and that of "focusing". Interaction in
the traditional sense is limited to the relation between body and
mind, whereas Dewey uses it in a much wider sense. For him there
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are "fields of interaction". ".Thile there is", says Dewey, "no
isolated occurrence in nature, yet interaction and connection are
not wholesale and homogeneous. Interacting events have tighter
or looser ties, which qualify them with certain beginnings and
endings, and which mark them off from other fields of interaction."
Dewey holds that there are "relatively closed fields", the exposi-
tion of which is found in the idea of the "three plateaus." They
are: (l) "the scene of narrov/er and more external interactions"...
the physical; (2) the level of life or the psycho-physical; (3)
33
the field of "association and coriimunication and anticipation."
The interaction of these fields often brings about "rough junc-
tures". However, these rough junctures are smoothed over by a
"homogeneous medium" through "translation and substitution."
"Translations and substitutions" are conscious directions and
science, whereby "critical alteration" may be effected; "new
34
energies .... released" ; and "new wualities ... appertained.
"
Both the mechanistic and the spiritualistic metaphysics
have given only a description of the smoothing over of these
35
junctures rather than an explanation and meaning. Dewey takes
it upon himself to bridge the gulfs betv/een these three levels
of interaction. His method of doing so is denotative and his
position is a naturalistic metaphysics. Reality is the growth-
process itself; early and later stages are only phases of a con-
tinuity. The later cannot exist until after the earlier. It
can mal^e use of what has been experienced and of the values already ^
36
realized. This combines both the germs of mechanism and teleology.
"^\n environment both extensive and enduring is immediately in
present behavior. Objectively speaking, the remote and the past
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are ’in’ beliavior nalcins it v/hat it is. The action called
"or.f^anic" is not ,iust that of internal structures: it is an in-
57
tSt^ration of or^^anic-enYironmental connections.'* The mvstery
of thinking as a subject-ob.iect relation disappears if this re-
lation is re.orarded as a relation of object to object. The only
question regaining is that of the nature of the factors in the
38
focalization of meanings.
Before we leave the problem of interaction, let us
consider the limits of interaction; in other words, what is the
circumstance v/ithin which interaction occurs. Dewey says that
the essential thing to be borne in mind is that "living as an
empirical affair is not something which goes on below the skin-
surface of an organism: IT IS /iLJAYS AIT IITSLUSIVB AITPAIH IH-
VOLYIiTG JOIBTBCTIOIT, IITTBRAGTIOIT OP "/HAT IS "/ITHIIT TH3 ORGAITIC
BODY AITD V/HAT LIES OHTSIDE IIT SPACi: AITD PITIS, .^dTD 71 'TH HIGHER
39
ORGAI'TISITS PAR OUTSIDE." Here we may contrast Dewey’s general
formula with that of JameS. The former labors to show, after
the fashion of Aristotle, the inseparability of body and mind
and organisms and meanings. There are possibilities and "levels"
of existences to communicate and interact. But reflection must
go on within the empirical environment. James, talcing the in-
validity of materialism and atheism for granted, argues from a
synthetic view of experience. Experience is not to be inter-
preted as confined within organic behavior. His empiricism is for
"real possibilities" of experience reaching out to a spiritualistic
universe; his pluralistic universe postulates universes of experience
Dewey finds the meaning of religion chiefly in the "social life",
40
a "life of shared experience" James in the "will to believe"
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or through the "faith-ladder'* whereby the "outline of nature" is
•softened and the highest and the best part of hunan nature
realized. Dewey stops short 'at the pragrnatic test of truth,
for he limits the field of interaction or experience to a na-
turalistic world whereas James goes beyond this and aims also
at the establishment of objective truth. Sut they both come
to the same point of view with regard to philosophy, namely, that
its purpose is to find the middle way between science and re-
ligion. Dewey says that the problem of philosophy is the ad-
justing of the dry, thin, and meagre scientific standpoint with
the "obstinately persisting body of warm and abounding imagina-
41
tive beliefs." Because of his revolt against traditional
metaphysics, Dewey did not carry this out as fully as did James.
b. Immediate "focus"; ITow we are ready to come to
the second phase of the problem of interaction, bamely the
"immedate focusing". In the first place, let us ask for a clear
definition or description of focus as it is used here. Ex-
perience is a "continuum", but it is to be found in life-activity,
"\7herever there is life, there is behavior, activity. ^ In order
that life may persist, this activity has to be both continuous
42
and adapted to the environment," Dewey sees the advantage
of using biological categories as "the development of a psychology
based upon biology makes possible a new scientific formulation
43
of the nature of experience."
Continuity implies direction and connection. "Direc-
tion", again, "involves a focusing and fixing of action in order
that it may be truly a response, Eind this requires an elimination
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of unnecessary and confusing movements." In order that we may
understand Dewey sympathetically and empirically we must not
forget the hiological interests; that is, the control of environ-
ment and the grasp..of meanings for social significance. "Focusing",
then, is one of the aspects of direction in activity. At a ten-
sional situation there may be diverse potential possibilities of
action that need selection and ordering. These are not separable
in practice as they are in idea. Dewey summarizes thus: "Focus-
ing and ordering are tv/o aspects of direction, one spatial, the
other temporal. The first insures hitting the mark; the second
45
keeps the balance required for further action." Space and
time, then, are not realities, so to speak. THey are "construc-
tions", as Dewey calls them. The focusing at one point of shin-
ing apparency is both "simultaneous" and "successive."
In the summary of this chapter, Dewey discloses his
purpose or position more clearly in traditional philosophical
terminology. He says, "This common understanding of the means
and ends of action is the essence of social control. It is in-
46
direct, or emotional and intellectual, not direct or personal."
Here Dewey discriminates the immediate from the mediate; the per-
sonal from the impersonal, making the personal direct, while
the emotional and intellectual are indirect, \7hat is the person-
al aside from the emotional and intellectual? At the surface, there
seems to be a problem, but when we view his analysis more
ly, vie shall find that it implies a privacy of conscious experi-
ence on the one hand, and on the other, that there must be a
medium if two minds know the same thing. The unity of the multi-
lie ity of experience is found then in the self v/ho owns a mind
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to select and direct, Dewey does not stop at the epistemological
problem as many "traditional" philosophers would, but he goes on
to the practical reason, so to speak. This "common understanding
of means and ends" is "intrinsic to the disposition of the person,
not external and cbersive" and "to achieve this internal control"
47
is to bring about the "identity of interest and understanding."
Instrumentali sml The function of understanding ajid that of in-
terest in whole of human experience, when connected, will render
life more meaningful. In science there are the "pure" sciences
and the "api^lied". But "the genuine interests of ’pure’ science
are served only by broadening the idea of application to include
48
all phases of liberation and enricliment of human experience."
Therefore Dewey’s emphasis is that understanding is for interest
rather than that interest is for understanding.
.
c. Reconciliation of science and philosophy; Another
motive in the thought of Dewey is to establish continuity be-
tween science and philosophy. V/hen we find out Dev/ey’s conception
of science and philosophy, we shall naturally ur^derstand and
appreciate the continuity of them in his thought. The present
need for both science and philosophy, according to Dewey, is
the "humanizing" of them. V/ithin science, the so-called "pure"
and "applied" should not be severed ultimately. vThat "makes a
proposition scientific is its pov/^er, to yield understanding, in-
sight, intellectual at-homeness, in connection ^y existential
state of affairs, by filling events with coherent and tested
49
meanings." Philosophy is a mode of criticism characterized by
50
its generality. Yet philosophy does not have a private access
to reality, for it must start from the empirical situation! of

58
life, characterized hy "immediate qualities" of good end had, and
must perform its duty as a logic of experience. The relation
hetv/een science and philosophy is found in ’auction’ or the "on-
51
going of action*. In other words, the practical of modern life
is to maintain the moral va.lues of civilization through the medium
of the insight and decision of the individual. The problem will
be foredoomed to failure unless the individual performs his task
with a definable and controllable tool. This tool is science.
Then science is truly a tool for civilization, the dignity of
science is evident. The importance of philosophy will also be
clear when it affords insight and direction of an "abundant life"
and a growing civilization.
d. The continuity of the real and the ideal: There is
a significant difference between putting out the finite hand
to the infinite and pulling back the infinite to the finite.
Dewey used to be characterized as the humanist, but his address
to the International Congress of Philosophy, as we have seen,
seems to mark a change, though not very radical, in his position.
He seems to indicate that the "empirical situation" is necessary
in the account of experience, but the present form, especially
the ’factual’ or ’partial’ form is not the best possible that
we are capable of. Dewey’s thought in this address is more of
a "philosophy of ideals" than of the "situations" either social
or individual in the biological sense. But the connection of
the real and the ideal must still be found in life activities,
even though the emphasis has been shifted from the actual to
the ideal.
3. Summary.
The "ingredients" of Dewey’s thought, then.
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are thus far seen; (l) social application of the Platonic ideas,
(2) the Hegelian dialectic as a tool to establish the continuity
of practica.! experience, (3) Peirce^ s making ideas clear” and
James’ pluralistic universe in the belief of risk and possibilities,
(4) Kant’s practical reason. Experience, for Dewey, then, is the
All-inclusive of truth and error, reality and appearance, imagina-
tion and dream, facts and fancies. To understand how these are
brought into a coherent system requires an investigation of the
underlying motive or motives of Dewey’s thought.
The motives, as we have just investigated, may be
summarized as follows: To point out that an ultimate separa-
tion of any phase of experience is fatal to philosophy; to es-
tablish continuity of experience by an evolutionary view of the
universe, to maJce activity, creativity, interaction, and prac-
ticality as important categories for philosophy; to plead for
speculative audacity and for more faith in ideas for richer and
higher experience.
Important as is the motive in establishing the con-
tinuity of experience, the consistency and truthfulness of the
fomulation of experience which we shall investigate in the
following sections are more important. From this summary we see
the next step of the investigation is necessarily^ the definitions
and implications of experience in Dewey’s writings.
B. Definitions of Experience.
It is generally acknowledged that the procedure of
any scientific formulation or criticism involves the follov/ing
steps; definitions, analysis, comparison and contrast, and syn-
thesis. To find the meaning of experience in the thought of
c
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John Dev/ey, let us ‘follow this procedure. However, we must
constantly warn ourselves against taking any incidental defini-
tion or remark of Dewey as his best definition; nor should we
judge his thought as a whole in the light of only one or two
definitions. Moreover, the privilege of development of thought
ought to he allowed to any thinker. Therefore we must watch
against too free a use of the principle of contradiction,
1, Experience and life.
According to Dewey, experience is closely
related to life. "^^enever there is experience, there is life,
52
Experiencing means living," It is "an affair of the inter-
course of a living being with its physical and social environ-
53
ment," Experience includes not only life and its environment
but also the activity which connects them. These assertions
are not aiming at a metaphysics, but rather at an attack on
traditional philosophy. ’.Then experience is aligned v/ith life-
process, neither sensationalism nor idealism are of much use.
If experience is properly understood all is v/ell with the rest.
But this tells us nothing more than that the interpretation of
experience depends upon its being formulated in view of the
life-process ... If philosophy is a "logic of experience", we demand
more than a mere statement of the problem.
'.Then Dewey asserts experience as "an affair
of intercourse of a living being with its physical and social en-
vironment" he creates two problems: the explanation of interaction
between nature and man, and between man and man. This is exactly
the challenge which James made to the Chicago School in 1904,
To meet this challenge there is need for a theory of the universe.
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a-nd of the sharable objective world, and of the individual. Con-
cerning the problem of interaction, we have seen that Dewey denies
the body-mind relation as a pro Diem. He recognizes, however, the
"rough junctures" in interaction, which need to be smoothed over.
To do this smoothing over Dev/ey makes a distinction between the
iinmediate and the mediate aspects of e3q)erience. The former is
a manifestation of the on-going of life-process; the latter, the
work of intentional direction or creative intelligence, which
not only converts the "unique" events into meaningful relations,
but also opens the road for further experience. The immediacy
54
of existence is unknown and unknov/able; categories of time
and space a.re constructions of the intellect, whereby the temporal
and the organizational qualities of existence may be arrested
and whereby we may have an objective world. The Kantian notion of
"Degriff" is applied by Dewey but the origin of its function
denied. Kore of Dewey's theory of the objective vmrld and its
sharabiiity we shall see in the following.
2. Experience and the Objective World.
Dewey says that he chooses the notion of experi-
ence chiefly because of what it "suggests about itself". '.That
55
it suggests about itself is a "genuinely objective world". To
postulate an "obj ective ' world"
,
according to Dewey, is to des-
troy the close relation between experience and knowledge which
56
he holds to be fallacious. Experience is identified with v^rhat-
ever happens in the universe. Every existence is an event; every
relation and meaning is an object. However, the latter is res-
tricted while the former is not. '7ithin this unfathomable, "in-
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effable", and "unknowable” existence there are the spots of lu-
minosity or focalization of meaning at points of immediate shin-
ing apparency. But as soon as Dewey asserts the interactions be-
tween the objective world and the sufferings and undergoings of-
men, he is mauling a subject-object distinction. Dewey may answer
that this distinction is one between objects in the objective
world. If this is the final resort, we may challenge the right
as well as the significance of shifting meanings of acknowledged
terms. \'fe grant the truth that so many philosophies are just so
many visions, but we demand that the visions be intelligible to
all.
However, Dev/ey does acknowledge the necessity of a
"medium" whereby events are converted into objects and meanings
and progress are made possible. These points of focalization
of meanings are capable of communication, as Boodin points out,
57
only through "an indeterminate process". The importance of
maJcing a distinction of subjective and objective elements of ex-
perience is important in any interpretation of experience. This
leads us to the next question of the relation between experience
and its datura.
3. Tbcperience and its datum.
Dev/ey says that the datum of experience is "alv;ays
the dubious; it is always a matter for subsequent events to de-
termine, to assign character to". Against this Dewey seems to have
made a contradictory statement when he says, "V/herever the influ-
ence of modern physios penetrated, the classic theory (doctrine
of design) became remote, faded, factitious, with its assertion
I1
• 1
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that natural olmnges are inherent movements tov/ards objects
which are their fulfilments or perfections, so tha.t the latter
are true objects of knowledge, supplying the foms or characters
59
under which alone changes may be known."
This contradiction will become apparent when we bring
in the statements concerning the unknowable character of immediate
existence a>nd objects as events with meanings, objects as fulfil-
ments or culminations, the imraanental character of organization,
inference, connections, structure and order as intellectual cons-
tructions. ’-That he objects to is the making of reality merely
objects of knowledge and the limiting of real possibilities in
the traditional theory of design.
.7ith regard to experience and its datum, Dewey’s
motive in a realistic hypothesis is well expressed in Boodin’s
aorticle "Is I’lsperience Self-Supporting?". "The motive for in-
venting realistic substances was no doubt the need of account-
ing for the seemingly potential character of things.... to meet
60
the need of social expectancy." This postulate is useful
only in the problem of knowledge, especially in viev/ of Dewey’s
distinction between knowing and being. To this problem we shall
return in a later section.
4. Experience and connections:
V7e believe it is here in order to point out that in
«
addition to the all-inclusive term experience, Dewey has a synonymous
one; namely, the term "natural". The "natural" is whatever occurs.
Therefore every phase and activity of experience according to
Dewey is a "natural" event. "Meanings are objective because they
-mip
'
'
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are modes of natural interaction.” This interaction includes
not only the organic "beings but also "things and energies” ex-
ternal to living creatures. The principle of connection is iden-
tical with thpt of meaning, for through social communication
meanings first emerge. 7/hen one is aware of future consequences,
he engenders meaning as he makes connections of his activities.
"V/henever communication occurs all natural events are subject
to revision and reconsideration; they are ae-adapted to meet the
requirement of conversation, whether it be public discourse or
62
that preliminary discourse termed thinking.” ILxperience, or
whatever happens and occurs, acquires meaning through connection,
interaction, relation, and participation. This is similar to
V/hitehead’s statement that "significance is the relatedness of
63
things. ”
'.Whether the realm of existence is different from
the realm of observed and designated experience or whether this
difference is one of emphasis in the nature of existence and in
the nature of meaning, is an issue of significance in one’s
position. Dewey at times recognizes meaning and existence as
the two asoects of every experience and of all reality, and at
64
times runs into contradiction. Meanings have their prerequisite
in the "existentia.1 stuff”, the organic and psycho-physical
activities with their qualities. The latter supply the mind with
65
its footing and connection in nature.
"Experience is pregnant with connections”, and "full
66
of inference”. Moreover, "experience carries principles of
67
connection and organization v/ithin itself,” Dewey does not doubt
ec
68
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that org8.nization of some sort exists in every experience.
"Reflection {joes on with profit only "because the materials with
which it deals have already some degree of organizaion or ex-
69
emplify various relationships." This sounds very much as if
Dewey were committing himself to the idealistic interpretation
of nature. Dewey could not escape this commitment even if he
should try, for his definition of mind as a "system of meanings"
and his conception of immanent organization of nature are arrived
at by his assumption that mind and nature are continuous. This
insight he says he owes to Kant I
5. Experience and mind and consciousness.
The "primary datura of every experience", Dewey
holds, is the situation of a contrast of the "inmediate, conspi-
cuous and focal phase of things... with those indirect ajid hidden
70
factors." In the same breath, Dewey says that one of the many
significations of consciousness is that it is identical v/ith
direct "apparitions", "obvious", and ^ vivid" presence of oualities
71
of meanings.
He seems here to have been using the idealistic
language and to have been taking the idealistic position. He is
aware of it too, for he immediately turns away, saying that the
immediate presence of meanings is not to be talcen 8.s more than
72
the "emphatic" characters of natural events.
Let us examine the situation where this "emphatic"
c'iiaracter of natural events occurs. Tie sajj^s that "every situation
or field of consciousness is marked by initiation, direction or
73
intent and consequence or import." Thinking is one of the in-
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stances of communication where natural events undergo a revision
and reconsideration. Revision and reconsideration are necessary
either when thinking occurs or when a tentional situation is pre-
sent. Consciousness not only initiates, directs, or intents, but
also foresees consequences. If these are the '•emphatic" characters
ox natural events, as he says, the identification of experience
v/ith conscious-experience is clear.
Consciousness is the "inimediate shining apparency";
"focal", end "transitive". There is a larger and wider field;,
na-’ely, that of mind. "Kind is contextual and persistent", it
denotes the whole system of meanings, which are embodies in all
the workings of organic life. The meaning of meaning we shall
have occasion to examine latter,
6. Sxperience and history.
The
-clearest statement concerning experience and
history is found in acoerience and nature where Dewey says,
"IJxperienoe is history." ' His whole discussion seems to be
in the spirit of Groce', s philosophy of history. Svery activity
he talces to be an episode in history. Reality is the life-process,
-rocperienoe in its vital form is characterized by the forvrard reach-
ing activity.
-That has gone befSre has made deposits which flow
in the whole stream of experience. V/e may call this interpreta-
tion of experience as history evolutionary and naturalistic. Con-
sequently he adopts the genetic and denctative method in his
philosophy.
In every experience or awareness of meaning, there
ion of the past, the present, and the "insistent" future.
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This union will become a mystery when we make an ultimate divi-
sion of nature and consciousness and when we deny the temporal
75
and historic quality in nature. Consciousness is one of the
"ends” of nature. In other words, meanings* are to be found in
76
total "histories” and in immanent temporal wholes. Gan memory
(in Dewey’s term, habit) and intelligence and intention or voli-
tion be the expressions of any integral other than personalities?
The answer to this question is crucial in Dewey’s thought.
0
7. Experience and personality.
Philosophy in some sense is a branch of morals;
that is to say, the theory of value is important for philosophical
reflection. The history of ethics well indicates the continu-
ous study of the problem of value. Since Lotze, Ritschl, and
Kietzsche, we have Heinong’s work followed by Shrenfels, and then
many of the contemporary thinkers such as Hoffding, Urban, Stern,
lloore, Croce, Perry, Brightinan. Dewey is one of the outstanding
77
thinkers on values.
His position is ciearly defined as "volun-
taristic" as against traditional hedonism and formalism. He
seems to try to show that value is neither experienced in frus-
tration of desires nor in the realization of them, but in the
capability of insight and of criticism whereby the rough junc-
tures of the continuity of experience may be redirected for more
extensive and more enduring values or meanings. He prefers the
terra meaning to value, but uses them interchangeably. He does
this in order that he may escape extreme individualism. It is
necessary, then, to see the relation between meaning or experience
and the individual.
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Dewey holds that psychology is important for philosophy;
therefore he is required to deal with the individual. He says,
"Psychology, supplying us with knowledge of the behavior of ex-
perience, is a conception of democracy. Its postulate is that
since experience fulfills itself in individuals, since it ad-
ministers itself through their instrumentality, the account of
the course and method of this achievement is a significant and
78 •
indispensable affair."
He points out that the dignity of human individuality,
79
a realm of inner experience purely personal, is a modern discovery.
But we believe that any one conversant v;ith the literature of
early Christianity, above all, conversant with Augustine, "den
80
ersten rnodernen Menschen", would hesitate in crediting the "dis-
covery of inner experience" to modern times. 'JVhat Dewey contends
here is that this "new worth and sense" of human individuality
has not reeached a place of social direction. It is true quite
true that "social" for Dewey is a supreme category, but the u-
niqueness of the individual is not entirely neglected by him.
ile regards the individual not as a mere property of nature, but
as a "unique" being who adds something and marks a contribution
to nature.
'.That is it that is contributed or added? In a tech-
nical language, it is a translation of the sequential or linear
logic to a causal and implicatory. V/hen things are involved in
hiunan associations, events become communicable meaning v/here
81
con-notation and de-notation are possible. The world of ex-
istence is not mere occurrences but also implications. "Hence,
inference and reasoning are possible; these operations are read-
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ins the message of things, which things utter because they are
82
involved in human associations." In other words, it is a trans-
formation of the sequence and co-existence into participation
83
through hiunan intervention. Experience, then, not only gains
its meaning through the persona,! factors but also a principle
whereby all experiences may be best interpreted. He says, "Human
beings illustrate the same traits of both immediate uniqueness
84
and connection, relationship, as do other things." vie heartily
agree with him that everything that is Jcno-'.Tn is in interaction
and that it is in individual where the multiplicity of experience
finds unity and continuity.
Since our task here is simply to show the relation
of experience and personality, we shall not go into the meta-
physical significance of Dewey’s qualified pluralism and monadism.
Je shall make a concluding remark so as to give a clue to our
later investigation and reflection. Dewey in answer to the ques-
tion as to where in his writinjs he has dealt most adequately
with the relation of experience and personality referred the
investigator to his Democracy and Education. In this work Dewey
attempts to establish a continuity between the personal and the
social. "Personal culture" and "social efficiency" are two as-
pects of the whole of meaningful experience. He says, how can
there be "a society really worth serving unless it is constituted
85
of individuals of significant personal qualities". This in-
stantly reminds us of Xant’s "kingdom of ends", ’.Ya-rd’s "realm
of ends", and the personal idealist’s "society of persons."
G. Constituents of Experience and Their Relations.
'Ye have seen how diversely experience has been defined
by Dewey. How we are ready to maice a further analysis and exhibit
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the primary and secondary elements of exiJerience and their rela-
tions. This re-examination v/ill afford us data for a formulation
of Dewey’s theory of experience, which, in turn, will serve as a
basis for an evaluation of his position.
Before we go on v/ith the formulation let us do some
picture- thinking by making one or two charts to indicate Dewey’s
theory of experience. Charts are often very useful if they sig-
nify meaning for us,
EXPSRiatJca
•
•
•
EXISTENCE
(events v/ithout meaning,
unknown and unknovvable)
•
•
•
MEANING
(objects, events with meaming,
known in interaction)
•
•
•
•
•
•
POCALIZATION
or
SYSTEM OP MEANINGS
•
•
IIIMEDiATE
(consciousness-narrower)
•
• #
•
MEDIATE
(mind--wider
)
•
•
•
9
•
•
•
•
Problem of
continuity
and unity
requiring
•
ADJUS'nCTT
/
TOOL OH liTSTHUIvDilTTALITY
Ideas
lOiowledge
Inference
Judgment
Intelligence
(understanding and inter-
est and intention)
MODUS OPSRAITDI
,,Projection
«
Anticipation
Participation
Risk
Ends
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From this diagram we notice that there are two aspects
of experience which are simultaneous and succestive in that ’'ob-
jects” have their "footing” in events, but events as such would
be unJ^nown unless they become meanings. In any discourse we can
deal with nothing but objects, that is, systems of meanings. In
every meaning there is always a contrast of the immediate and the
mediate, i.e., consciousness and mind. As soon as there is this
contrast there is engendered the problem of the continuity and
unity of the immediate and the mediate, which is essential if
exi)erience is to go on. The problems necessitate adjustments
effected through the instrumentality of intelligence function-
ing in projection, anticipation, and participation.
7/hat we have just shov/n is only an epitome of Dewey's
theory of experience. ITow, we shall turn to a more detailed
explanation of the constituents of experience and their rela-
tions. The diagram sho-wn on page seventy two may serve to elucidate
the following exposition.
The primary realm of experience is in the contrast and
adjustment of the iinmediate focal phase of things with those in-
direct and potential factors, which determine the origin and career
86
of the present. This shows that experience, or more strictly
speaking, the interpretation of experience, must start from an
iimaediate consciousness against the remote or indirect. Both of
these are in the realm of meaning, which is a "restricted” phase
of reality. There are two phases of reality or experience; poten-
tiality and actuality, corresponding to existence and meaning
respectively.
37
To satisfy the requirements of his denotative method.
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Existence
L i J 1 L'±'J
i- i_ 1 L '_J 1
JL i-T-'-i J. L' J
1 E U_L Li_i_
4“ 4
—
f"
-f' 4 4< -4- -f-
T ^ 4
Events (no relations)
lleanings
Objects (events in
interactions and
relations
)
Meanings are
restricted,
falling within
the realm of
existence as
ends of events.
Immediate
Consciousness--Eocal
Transitive
a system of meanings
Hind
a constant luminosity
: immediate and focal
Individual mindjas compared to its
;vast environment
Environr.ient ; physical and social, pregnant
of organization and inference.
The individual gains significance by being
and end of nature.
The common ground of individuals is the "shared
situation" and "joint activity". The social
category, therefore, is supreme.
1.
Contrast of the immediate and the remote
necessitates adjustment.
2.
In the adjustment a "rough jur.cture" is
engendered as a result of interaction.
3.
The "rough juncture" needs to be smoothed
over by the operation of creative intelligence
in projection, revision, redirection, and
participation.
4.
In the process of experiencing events acquire
meanings, the range of which becomes v/ider
and wider. This is the life process identical
with reality. To be an individual mind is to
be capable of this experience.
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Dewey attempts to go beyond this system of meanings to point their
origin and career. He regards "event” as fundamental constituent
of exiDerience, Every existence is an event. Events becomes ob-
jects when interaction occurs and when characters are assigned.
Events and objects are not intermittent lights, appear-
ing and disappearing, for once events become objects there are
new energies released, new properties gained, and new systems
of meaning created. Meanings will go on in thdise interacting
elements or factors. These on-going of me.aning in those inter-
acting elements fo not have a straight path for there are infinite
possibilities of activity which need translation, substitution,
revision, and redirection. To a.ccomplish these, we need a "con-
trollable tool", which according to Dewey, is science and philoso-
phy, the operation of which is the work of creative intelligence.
In the operation of creative intelligence Dewey discriminates several
primary factors; namely, intention, initiation, reconsideration,
and participation. However, there is still risk in the process
of realizing any particular end. Dewey, in his address to the
Congress of Philosophy showed great faith in ideas as a means of
social and intellectual progress.
To make this exposition of Dewey’s formulation of ex-
perience more concrete, let us follow him in his own illustration,
i.e., the experience of human beings. '.There is the starting-point,
then? Dewey points out that any interpretation of experience must
start from the same datum in v/hich conscious experience begins. This
is a situation where the Mmiediate consciousness is in contrast
with the na.rger frontiers of mind. The individual goes through
reflective experience in the interaction of consciousness and the
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environment. In the process of interaction there are "rough junc-
tures" to be smoothed over, "ambiguous and uncertain facts" to be
made clear, "antipathies" and "tentional situations" to be released,
and new courses of action to be adapted. In those activities the
immediate data from which controlled inference proceeds are not
objects but means of hno?/ledge, things by which we know rather
87
than things known. The next step is to proceed from the simple
datura to inference, v/hich is the great business of life, and the
88
only occupation in which the mind never ceases to be engaged.
The complete process of thinking Dewey analyses into five steps,
in his book How V/e Think . Thirdly, Dewey holds that activity is
the chief characteristic of experience. Human beings in the game
of life are "obligated" to struggle and to choose and to run a
89
risk.
90
Man^acts anyv/ay for he cannot help acting. Some
activity is higher than others for some activities make reference
to incentive or motive while others do not. This again illustrates
his distinction of levels of interaction and of life. In conscious
activity we find not only the "analytic resolution", but also the
91
"synthetic conspectus", whereby reorganization becomes possible.
Kan may begin with a mere v/ish, an emotional reaction against the
present state of things a,nd a hope for something different. Ideals
are thereby projected, which would afford satisfaction if realized.
A mere ideal in itself is simply a fancy, a dream. Nevertheless,
these are experiences.
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D. Kinds of Experience.
1. Experience; non-reflective and reflective.
t
Dev/ey distinguishes in experience the non-reflec-
tive and the reflective. The following diagrain may serve as an
analysis of this distinction.
EKPERIEtTCE .
• • si
• • •
HOIT-REFLECTIVE : :
: : :
Focus and context : :
(intrinsic content) ; :
• • •
• • •
Internal organization ; :
(non-logical ) ; ;
: : :
Tentional situation REFEbtCTIVE :
• * •
• •
• •
• •
Purpose or task :
(extrinsic reference) :
• •
• •
- : ;
Reorganization y CONSUlvIL'IATORY
( experimen tal)
A brief study of the traits of each of these types
of experience may afford confirmation of Dewey’s meaning of ex-
perience as we have interpreted it. The most evident trait of
the non-reflective experience is the quality of "pervasive unity"
or "internal organization" in any empirical situation. "Focus"
and "context" are the other important traits of the non-reflective
experience. Every focalized experience is momentary, but around
it there are "immediate dynamic connections with portions of ex-
93
perience not at the time obvious.
Reflection is dominant only when there is a tentional
94
situation. Then it functions to propose a "task", set by the
\..'iai
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empirical and concrete situation. The task is to be performed
by trying out in action its proposition for reorganization.
Reflection ceases when this task is doen; otherv/ise, further in-
quiry continues; therefore all knowledge issuing from reflection
95
is "experimental'*. Thus, to Dewey the reflective experience
is a later stage of experience, an "experimenta.l act". It is an
"intermediate" stage, because it has to"pass naturally into a
more direct and more vital type of experience; whether tech-
96
nological or appreciative or social." Reflection must be
97
taken. as an "extrinsic reference" instead of intrinsic content.
2. Experience: instriunental and consammatory.
• Another classification of experience is that
of the instrumental and consumm tory. Another diagram to our aid.
:
;
SXPEHIllTCS
1
• •
• •
• •
IITSTRTJIO'TTAL COITSTJI.niATORY
• •
• •
• •
• •
: Ends
• • •
• • •
• • •
• • •
; natural :
: (Sequential order) :
: lioral
Artificial (Directional order)
In attacking the tradi tonal dualisms, Dewey has
made his own dualisms, though he attempts to connect them after
they are made. Ror example, there are the "primarily natural
ends" and the "secondarily natural ends." The former are natural
ends; the latter, practical and moral ends. He emphatically urges
philosophers not to confuse them. "A natural end which occurs
r* W
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without human art is a terminus, a de facto "boundary", but when
we choose, we are obviously dealing with practical ends-- "with
objects and qualities that are deemed worthy of selection by
98
reflective, deliberate choice." Natural ends indicate "coersive
necessity" while ends, indicate "useful labor". Here we find
the root for the distinction of the instrumental experience and
the consamraatory,
3. Jlxperience; Subjective and objective.
The distinctions between instrumental and con-
summatorjp, according to Dewey, a,re classifications made in judg-
ment. Reality is a continuous experience and experiencing. These
distinctions are only practical for human discourse, which necessi-
tates a subjective-objective distinction, Dewey says that the
subjective view of experience is chiefly "the hiunan attitude and
99
interest, record and interpretation." Hov/ever, subjective
100
experience itself is a natural event within the objective world.
The consuramatory phase of experience is found
101
in "direct appreciative enjoyment", and it is natural. '.Vhereas
instrumental experience is "artificial" because it is a resultant
of the work of intelligence in projecting, sleeting, and producing.
But means and ends are two names for the same reality. The dis-
tinction between the subjective and objective experience does not
denote a division in reality itself, but only a distinction in
102
judgment.
E. Summary,
In this chapter we have made an excursion into the
origin and growth of Dewey’s theory of experience. In the first
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place v/e enquired as to the leading motives in his theory, and
there we find a tendency of all modern philosophy; namely, an
emphatic appeal for return to experience. To return to experience
is to do away with the habit of thinking
-in two insulated uni-103
verses of discourse". m other words, it is to establish con-
tinuity. It is easy to make an appeal to experience and to ask
what experience is, but to answer the question is not as easy as
it seems.
The answer which Dewey gives us in effect is thathas
experience includes all that actually taken place or is now tak-
ing place and all that might possibly happen. The logic of ex-
perience must have its primary datum in the practical activities
and attitudes grourd ed upon an empirical basis of concrete values
and events. Bawden says, "But the word( experience) is coming to
have a wider meaning when used to express the totality of things
for a person's consciousness. Sxperience in this sense, is the
whole web of life, the universe from an individual point of view."
Dewey is more cautious in his foimulation of experience in relation,
to the personal factor. The reason for this is that he finds a
less dangerous empirical ground in the social category, which
implies: ( 1 ) "a universal characteristics of all existences";
(2) "knowledge.. in terms of related objects"; (3) "the nerve of
science", the correlation of "association among things";
( 4 ) ..an
actualization of potentialities"
"in interaction"; (5) "support"
to the "hypothesis of continuity"; (6) A d'emarcation of the "meta-
physical description and ’understanding" of "the ’widest and fullest
range of associated activity"; (7) "a 'realm of mind' objective to
an individual, by entering into which as a participating member
organic activities are transformed into acts having a mental quality!
10<
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For Jarnes as well as Dewey, reality and experience come
to be the same thing; their distinction is a methodological or
functional one. Seality in its becoming process gives us ex-
perience; experience examined and controlled by intelligence
yields an insight into reality.
In order that he may escape the incompleteness of "ab-
stracted" experience (experience in the conceptual form), Dewey
resorts to the social category, which includes both the "intrinsic
content" and "extrinsic reference". ,7e may have an adequate
"philosophical account of things" .... "ba.sed upon talcing things
in the widest and most complex scale of associations (relation-
106
ships) open to observation."
Dewey’s account of experience in the essay, "The Need
for a Recovery of Philosophy" may be summarized as follows;
1. Experience is not primarily knowledge,
but intercourse of a living being with
his physical and social environment.
2. .Experience is not subjective, but objective.
3. Experience is not a "registration of what
has taken place", but is experimental and
forward-looking.
4. Experience is not atomistic, but "pregnant
with connections",
5. Experience is not opposed to thought, but
constantly and full of inference.
107
Despite his empiricism and instru:uentalism Dewey has
not escaped rationalism, in the sense of a belief in the possi-
bility pf a theoretical metaphysics. An examination of his meta-
physics will be made in the following chapter.
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Chapter III
THE ICETAPHYSICS OE DIT'/EY-’S EXPEIilEHCS-PHILOSOPHY
<%
Before we look for the presentation of the metaphysics
of experience-philosophy, we must determine what type of 'experi-
ence-philosophy Dewey holds, as there are many versions of it.
Let us take a few of his contemporaries for example. The philo-
sophy of .Villiam James, especially as formulated in his Pluralistic
Universe, is taken to he "la philosophie d’ experience" in Prance.
James says, "Everything experienced must somewhere he real."
Reality and experience come to the same thing. In discussing
knowledge ahd concepts, James shows the relativity of our present
experience and our experience within the natural zones. "Sensible
reality is too concrete to he entirely manageable loiik at the
narrow range of it which is all that any animal, living in it
exclusively as he does, is able to compass .. .’Jhat we do in fact
is to harness up reality in our conceptual systems in order to
drive it the better. This process is practical because all the
termini to which we drive are particular termini, even when they
2
are facts of the mental order." James’ experience-philosophy
has been characterized as "creative experience" in that it is
synthetic, voluntaristic, and spiritualistic. Experience to James
is not only continuous, since "all the units ... overlap"
,
but also
3
systematic since it is "successive as well as simultaneous". Thus
far he is at one with Dewey. But James holds that religious ex-
perience "softens nature’s outlines and opens out the starngest
4
possibilities and perspectives." This philosophy is Pecherian
in that it is spiritualistic. Dewey regards both materialism and
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spiritualisn as incomplete accounts of reality,
Bowne labels his system personalism, a theistic
philosophy with transcendental empiricism as a methodology. He
presents three basal facts for philosophy; namely, "the personal
world, the common reason, and the world of experience". James
in one way or another has made practically the same postulates
or presuppositions. "All experience", Bowne says, "is real only
through some given fact, and apart from such facts is empty",
for "when experience is given we have no longer simple logical
concepts, but we have something lived and realized."^ Bowne
also agrees with James in that the "true nature of experience"
demands us to "keep open the door of possibility".^ Bo^vne siuns
up his transcendental empiricism as follows; "a careful scrutiny
of our terms and a resolute adherence to experience",'^ This is
the germ of pragmatism. Both Bomie and James agree with Dewey
that "experience is the first and basal in all living and think-
ing, and that all theorizing must go out from experience as its
gbasis, and return to it for its verification",
Sven Boyce J He says that to his mind, "the only
demonstrable truths of an ultimate philosophy relate to the
constitution of the actual realm of experience, and to so much
only about the constitution of this realm as cannot be denied
without self-contradiction, menever. in dealing with experience,
we try to find what, on the whole, it is and means, we philosophize!
James interprets experience in its present richness
and future real possibilities; while Bowne, following Kantian
and Lotean tradition, makes experience final and basal for philo-
sophical enterprise and personality the chief category, Royce
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says that he not -only accepts but also insists upon Kant’s state-
ment, "ITur in der Erfahrung ist .7ahreit'' ( "V/hat is real is an ex-
10
perience presenting the fulfilment of the whole purpose of ideas”).
But he questions further as to what kind of being has experience.
jixperience in general is again in the abstract, an appeal to the
11
ideal authority. He holds that "as a fact, only individual
12
experience is real, be that the experience of man or God."
This is what Dr. Cell calls "ontological significance of person-
ality" in the thought of Royce.
Shall we say with Durant then, "that on nearly all
of the fundamental problems nearly all of the philosophers agree;
their differences being due rather to the terminology of their
14
time than to the hostility of their thoughts."
I'Tow we are ready to look into Dewey’s experience-phi
philosophy in relation to his methodology and metaphysics. Devrey
calls his method "empirical" or "denotative", which he defines as
pointing out "when, where, and how things of a designated des-
15
cription have been arrived at," "To answer any question, to
settle any discussion, and still any doubt, v/e must go to some--
16
thing pointed to, denoted, and find our answer in that thing."
Dewey also designates this method as "experience method". Does
this mean anything more than the assertion that experience must
be the starting-point as well as the final court of appeal in any
philosophic reflection or enterprise.
A, Experience and Hature,
In relation with his description of the experience
method, we find the entrance into the metaphysics of the experience-
c
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l)hilosop]iy • For example, Dewey says that "the notion of 'experi-
ence reminds us that, prior to philosophic reflection, objects
have fallen into certain groupings, designated by the adjectives
we already prefix to the word experience; adjectives like, moral,
esthetic, intellectual, religious, personal, political". Then
he says that "the final issue of empirical method is v/hether the
guide and standa^rd of beliefs and conduct lies within or v/ithout
18
the sharable situations of life." This logically and inevitably
leads up to an inquiry into the nature of the groupings of objects
and the sharable world.
’Then Dewey is formula-ting this problem, he is answer-
ing the great challenge of VTilliam James upon the Chicago School
twenty-five years ago, a challenge for a cosmology (the nature
of the existing world) and an ontology (the theory of being).
Dewey quotes Spencer in his statement that every fact has tv/o
opposite sides; the near or visible side and the remote or in-
visible. These express a persistent trait of every object in
experience. "The visible is set in the invisible; and in the
end what is unseen decides v/hat happens in the seen; the tangible
19
rests precariously upon the untouched and ungrasped." These
20
are traits of the primary data in any experience.
1. The nature of the v/orld as giving rise to metaphysics.
The predominant nature of the world Dewey character-
izes as "a scene of risk; it is uncertain, unstable, uncannily
21 22
unstable"; and "it is hazardous". Here Dewey’s concern is with
metaphysics, the nature of the existential world in which we live,
and not with morals. Dewey recognizes that this indeterminate
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cliaracter of the nature of the world gives rise to philosophy.
Therefore all philosophies attempt to interpret its meaning ajid
to make man at home in the world. Traditonal philosophies suffer
23
and have quarrels in the "acceptance of a co::']mon premise". There
fore it is necessa.ry to go afield or outdoors so as to find a
larger perspective and see the whole picture. Here Dewey is apply
N
ing the coherence criterion in determining for himself an adequate
premise. V/here is the fertile field, or such a premise? Dewey
points to "experience in unsophisticated forms", which "gives
evidence of a different vrorld and points to a different meta-
24
physics". It is to deal with the "cognizance of the generic
4
traits" of the world that Dewey says one may have a metaphysics,
for he holds that this is a good definition and the primary
function of metaphysics. But there are two sides to this pro-
blem: theoretically, it is a matter of relations of objects in
the situations of life; practically, it is a question of the best
25
use which can be made of each of them.
2. The nature of the objective v;orld.
"Objective relativism" is used to designate Dewey ^s
epistemology, and may also be employed, we believe, to character-
ize his naturalistic metaphysics. He says, "If human experience
is to express and reflect this world, it must be marked by needs;
in becoming aware of the needful and needed quality of things it
must project satisfactionsxor completions. For irrespective of
whether -a satisfaction or non-satisfaction is an objective thinfi:
26
with obj ective factors". It is objective because it is con-
ditioned by objective partialities and defections and made real
by objective situations and completions.
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To establish his objectivism Dewey distinguishes event from
object* 3very existence is s-n event. Thinking, for instance, is
one of the natural events. Santayojia says that "affaira’' and "situ-
ations" represent the ethical nerve of Dewey’s philosophy while
27
"events" and "history" "point to the flux of matter". Santayana
also points out that "event is now a favorite word among philoso-
^
28
phers who are addressed to the study of nature. " Dewey uses
the concept of event synonymously with change. That the character
of existence is eventful, however, is no reason for consigning it
29
to the realm of mere appearance.
Svents are Dewey’s metaphysical elements. He says that "in
every event there is something obdurate, self-sufficient, wholly •
ii'nmediate, neither a relation nor an element in a relational whole,
30
but terminal and exclusive." Svents become objects when they
are in a context in which they acquire new ways of operation auid
new character. The immediacy of existence is ineffable auid un-
knowable, but objects are events in interaction, forming a system
of meanings. It is within the system of meanings that we have
knowledge of things.
3. Time and space implicit in the growth process.
The problem of time andspace is as old as philosophy. The
problem of time became more predominant in modern philosophy, es-
pecially after the evolutionary theories began to occupy important
positions in philosophy and science. Dewey in formulating any
philosophical theory begins with a description of the "insoluble
problems" which traditonal philosophies have created. To make
objects timeless is to create such a problem. "But in fact every-
thing denoted", Dewey says, "is found to have temporal quality end re
ference; it has movements from and toward within it; it is marked
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by waxings and v/anings”. The temporal quality, then, is in-
herent in the object. Experience is history in that it is a
growth process and the becoming itself. As we have seen under
the discussion of human life, Dev/ey says that we are obligated
to go on in the on-going of experience.
Time and space in an order or structure are intellec-
tual arrangements. Events are the becomings themselves; the slow-
er and the regular rhythmic events may be designated as structure
and the more rapid and regular as process. Structure is a
character of events. The immediacy of the temporal quality of
32
events is unknown until it eventuates in "constructions".
"Construction" is the evident "order of changes". Strcuture is
the intellec tualization of temporal quality and is realized only
in construction. "That Dewey objects to is the separation of
strcuture from the changes, which creates a "metaphysical ghost"
of time. Temporal and spatial orders are non-existential
. They
are. They are instrumentalities which function to regulate the
course of historical events.
4. Interaction of diverse elements in the objective world,
Dewey uses the principle of interaction in the
widest sense of the word instead of limiting it to the body-mind
relation. Communication and interacourse are often used synonymous-
ly with interaction. However, he distinguishes three fields of
interaction; first, the field of physical interaction, which is
narrow and externa,!; second, the field of life interaction, in terms
of psycho-physical; third, interaction by association, communica-
33
tion, and participation, in terms of mind and meanings. '.7e have
seen Dewey holds that both the mechanistic and the spititualistic
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metaphysics have their contributions to the interpretation of
experience, "but the notion of causal explanation involved in
both of them implies a breach in the continuity of historic i)ro-
34
cess...." He takes it upon himself to bridge the gulf. The
gulf is bridged when reality is recognized as "the grov/th-process"
and v^hen real existence is taken to be "history in its entirety".
In this Dewey attempts, to combine the insight of the- mechanistic
materialism (the later cannot exist until the earlier exists),
/
a.nd the interpretation of spiritualistic teleology (the later
makes use of the registered and culminative outcome of the earlier).
He denies the traditional notion of causality either in the mech-
anistic or the spiritualistic form, but holds to evolutionary
naturalism, in which the denotative method may function as a
good instriunent to the interpretation of experience.
The following dia.gram may serve as a summary of the
process of interaction and the evolution of life:
Cause •> effect The field of physical order
Stimulus ^ > response The field of life
Heans <= - consequence :
: The field of consciousness
Direction consummation;
Each level has its oYm distinct
categories.
There is an increasing complexity of interaction
in each succeeding level.
1 .
2 .
3
.
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Dewey’s position in this connection manifests two ten-
dencies in recent science; namely, (l) the behavioristic tendency
in bringing hiunan conduct into the physical world; (2) the dis-
35
satisfaction with "speculative naturalism" and the frank ad-
mission of creative synthesis in nature with accompanying critical
36
points and nev/ properties. Through the hypothesis of interaction,
Dewey seems to bring an evolutionary synthesis whereby striking
differences are united under "genetic continuity". The phrase
" intelligent behavior" or " conscious behavior" gives the clue
to the interpretation of experience in the light of "genetic con-
tinuity", but it is not self-explanatory. An explanation of the
"genetic c.ontinuity" in "creative synthesis " in nature will be
given under the discussion of experience and consciousness in
section 3 of this chapter,
5, ITatural teleology
To venture upon the use of the word "ends" in connec-
37
tion with existential processes is a dangerous proposition. In
the first place there are tv/o meanings of this word: one is the
fulfilment of events; the other, ends-in-view. "Each is intelli-
gible, grounded, and legitimate in itself. But their mixture is one
38
of the Great Bads of philosophy." Dewey points out that the pro-
blem of teleology lies in the problem of evil or dysteleology
, To
clear up the foreground, as usual Dewey starts by pointing out the
bias of Greek metaphysics and Christian theology concerning ends.
a. natural and moral ends: In our classification of ex-
P^pisnce we have seen the distinction made by Dewey betv/een na-
tural ends, inevitable beginning, process, and ending of natural
events; and the moral ends, a matter of "reflective choice" or a
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•deliberate construction"* The former is predominantly fulfil-
ments of tilings j tlie latter* ends-in-view for further activities.
It is one thing to assign temporal quality to events, character-
ized by beginning, process, and ending and another to control
the course of events for further activities. One is metaphysical
or existential and the other, practical or moral.
Dewey has thrown av/ay ultimate teleology with the
traditional doctrine of design. Traditonal teleology has lost
its significance in our modern life since voluntaristic, tem-
poralistic (evolutionary), and pluralistic theories have become
the tendencies. The will to believe in possibilities, the finite
God idea, the emergent theory of evolution, and the creative in-
telligence, all of these seem to have pushed "ultimate teleology"
to the dark background, Dewey’s position is an "immediate em-
piricism"; the immediacy of existence is ineffable, on the one
hand; and an instriunental meliorism, to have intelligence direct
the course of life as far as possible, on the other. To endeavor
to dearch for the smnmum bonum is an otiose affair and to attempt
the impossible is futile. Therefore, teleology, if discussed at
all, is not to be taken in the metaphysical sense (ultimate teleo-
logy), but in the iramediate and practical control of the course
of events. Dewey’s is a natural teleology because he holds that
all ends are found within nature, and because the situation and
the end-in-view are equally important. Our question here is
expository, not critical; therefore the validity of the distinc-
tion between the moral and the metaphysical will be discussed
later in the evaluation.
t-
s
T
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Id. Evolution; 'Vliether one holds a na.tural evolution or ultimate
teleologyi he must consider the evolution of life and the problem
of value. In regard to the former, Dewey explains evolution in
terras of ’’three levels of life”, each being a higher development
of the previous. The higher the being is the better he ada,pts
the environraent to himself and the more complex is his grasp of
meaning and relations. But continuity is emphasized. In this
continuity, production and consumption or means and ends are
continuous and interdependent. But to emphasize the separation
in order to exalt the consummation is to fail to define and in-
terpret experience.
However, v/hen the empirical data are changed,
the categories are necessarily changed with them; cause and
effect are the categories in the physical level, stimulus and
response in the psycho-physical, menas-consequences and meanings
in the third. The relation of means-consequences is one of the
processes which is at once a temporal succession and a, culminative
and constitutive deposit at different points and different stages.
This is v/hat we have seen to be the ’’genetic continuity” of ex-
perience. Kant says, ”An organized product of nature is one in
which everything is an end and reciprocally also means; nothing
in it is in vain, nothing purposeless, or to be described to a
40
blind mechanism of nature.” Dewey agrees with this statement
as far as it is limited in application v/ithin the empirical data,
but if it is used as the ground for the formulation of an ulti-
mate teleology, Dev/ey parts company. He shows his ov/n interest
in the following statement; ”A disposition of virtue is a means
to a certain quality of happiness because it is a constituent
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of that good, v/hile such ha^opiness is means in turn to virtue,
41
as the sustaining of good in being." 7/hat Dewey has done is
to substitute for the traditional teleology an evolutionary
process of growth.
c. Value; ^Vhen Dewey asserts that the level of life or
meaning is the highest of the three, he is evaluating the pro-
cess. V/hen he says that reflection is the instrument through
v^hich "freer and more enduring good are sec’Jired", he is making
42
"reflection. . .a unique intrinsic good" Reflection is an
activity "which constantly uncovers in the object nev/ meanings
43
to be perceived and enjoyed." Therefore, in the process of
new discoveries, value and the objects that possess value change.
They change with the "contingencies" of existence, the environ-
ing raediijm, and with the changes in human beings in their power
44
of grasping meaning. 7/hat Dewey objects to is a "block universe."
To have a theory of value is to enter into the field of
45 46
criticism. Any brief course of experience enforces reflection,
for values are not as plentiful as huckleberries, nor is the
huckleberry-patch always at hand. Man seems to have not only a
great diversity of desires, but also a "dialectic" in the process
of their realization; therefore desire or enjoyment constantly
47
ceases to be a datum and beomes a problem. "As a problem, it
implies intelligent inquiry into the conditions and consequences
48
of a value-object; that is, criticism." Appreciation and cri-
ticism are the most obvious conscious experiences, closely rela-
ted experiences. Our waking experiences are always in manners of
taking attitudes, maicing inquiries and estimations, and exercising
49
preferences and choices.
s
"Memory and foresight " are necessary
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elements in the possession and enjoyment of value-objects. Other-
wise, criticism would be the most wilful of undertakings. Is this
not enough evidence for the assertion that only those beings who
are capable of memory, foresight, ajid reflection are capable of
'‘realizing" and "carrying" values? Dewey has told us that on
the human plane, responses to things are made in their meanings,
and that "to be conscious of meanings or to have an idea, marks
50
a fruition, an enjoyed or suffered arrest of the flux of events."
In order to make Dev/ey’s theory of value more concise
and clear, we shall give the following analysis in a diagram form:
i . Empirical situation
Oonflicts
In good
The imriediate
The given Vs
The now( apparent
)
The ulterior
The reached and justified by
The eventual (reflection
In morals
Immediate goods Vs The desired and reasonable
goods
In esthetics
Goods of undevelbp- Vs Goods of cultivated taste
ed and perverted
taste
In knowledge
Beliefs de facto Vs Beliefs de jure
Critical judgment
The false, specious, illus- The true, real, final or
sory, 3ho’,vy, le faux bon objective goods
ii. Table of values
Iirmiediate values--posse3sed and enjoyed
"Critical" values— evaluation of the "real", the eventual....
instituting and perpetuating more enduring
3nd extensive values.
, -i3
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The issue ; value of reflection?
Value of reflection discovery
condition,
of relation,
consequence
iii. Philosophy and value
Philosophy: a, deliberate and systematic pursuit of this
"critico.l operation and function" which becomes "aware
of itself and its implications" in "all regions of va-
lues", giving "greater freedom and security in those acts
of direct selection, appropriation, identification, and
rejection, elimination, and destruction which enstate
and which, exclude objects of belief,- conduct, and con-
templation.
The criterion; comprehensiveness and consistency
The end; to convert causal natural values (whose cause
and effect are unknov/n) into goods; valid for thought,
right for conduct, a.nd cultivated for appreciation. 51
Value is realized in the temporal process of grov/th.. The
intelligent the instrumentality or art is, the more enduring and
extensive the values v/i 11 be. The process in the conversion of the
"natural" values into the intellectual, moral, and esthetic is
found in nature, --hence a "natural teleology".
B. Zlxperience and Meaning.
The idealist may be said to be the one who holds an
identity of being and knowing; the pragmatist, identity of being
and doing. Kant says that a being is known through its activities;
Lotze, a thing is where it acts. The principle of activity and
the notion of relation are modern discoveries; at least, they are
brought to the foreground in philosophical dlgoussion in the modern
time. Pragmatism, especially in the Deweyan form, is a philosophy
of activity, both na,tural and moral. In the last section, we have
seen the nature of the objective world within which both good and
evil are discriminated. Reality or the objective vmrld, is a chang-
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in'j process, a 136001111112. This must lie harnessed or arrested by
reflection. In the process of beings events in interaction be-
come objects or events with meaning. Some meanings are transi-
tive; others more persistent. In Dewey’s designation they are
consciousness and mind respectively.
1 . Consciousness and meaning.
In the previous section we have just seen that the
method of intelligence and of science is to recreate the causal
goods of nature into intentional and conclusive goods of art,
with meanings in which knowledge and value are one. The realiza-
tion of value or the unification of value and knowledge is only
a "process" within nature, lijcperience is alv/ays dynamic, that
is to say, the becoming is a series of events. Consciousness
"is that phase of a system of meanings which at a given time is
52
undergoing redirection, transitive transformation". Since
consciousness is the meaning of events in the course of remaking
it is clear then that consciousness is not a separate realm of
being, but the manifest quality of existence or the "emphatic
character" of events,
V/hat is meaning then? Dewey’s meaning of meaning is
53
brought out very clearly in a recent discussion. Since our
task for the present is expository, we shall then take up only
what Dewey regards to be his ov/n position, Dewey in this dis-
cussion emphatically asserts that he holds that "events acquire
54
meanings" or "meanings occur within nature." In the first
place, Tire are to bear in mind the duality of existence and mean-
ings, The denotative method accounts for both the "locus of
origin" and "genesis" of further developments and functions of
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meanings. "I certainly hold", says Dewey, "that there are natural
’pre-requisites’ of the origin of meanings in communication, A-
mong these indispensable preconditions are the immedia^te qualities
called in psychological terminology, ’feelings’; these are the
55
existential basis and ’stuff’ of meanings." They exist prior
to and independent of any " sign-func tions" , Though they guide
behavior in all hinds of subtle ways, they are not meanings.
Recourse to antecedent conditions is always necessa.ry in any
critical search for the validity of meaning. Thus the right
determination of meanings involves considerations of "total his-
tories", The distinction of instrumental and final meanings is
artificial and correlative if the total situation is reviewed,
(Another phase of the problem of meaning is the dis-
tinction of referential and immanental meanings. Dewey explicit-
ly says that "immanent meanings exist in consequence of the re-
56
peated successful outcome of referntial or evidential meanings."
The crucial issue lies in the hypothesis that "a thing signifies
another thing in being employed as an evidential sign, and that
57
in this RELATIOIT both acquire meaning". This agrees with
V/hitehead’ s position that the significance of a thing is its re-
latedness.
Dewey says that when the idealist asserts the certa.inty
of the immediately and focally present as the data on which to
build, he is making a transference from the substantial to the
dialectical. "’This’, whatever this may be, always implies a
system of meanings focussed at a point of stress, uncertainty,
and need of regulation. It suras up history, and at the same
time opens up a new page; it is record and promise in one; a
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fulfilment and an opportunity.- m consciousness (the
-this-)
there is the union of the past and the future with the present.
But consciousness is not a distinct entity. It is the momentary
quality of
-the operative interpretation in the nature of the
59
efficient and the fulfillings.
" Personality or selfhood is no-
thing but the
-eventual functions that emerge with oomplexily
organized interactions, organic and social, the system of meanings,
or mind.
2. Meaning and mind.
Interaction in its natural form, communication,
is the bridge where existence and essence
-join- in a continuous
activity. As soon as events are
-named- they i.mediately lead
"an independent and double life-.®^ They become at once existence
and meaning or ideal experimentation, and consequently thought.
In other words, events have communicable meanings in ideal Ixperi-
raentation or the realm of thought because they have implications
capable of denotation and connotation.®^ Tlius events acquire
character cheifly within
-human associations-. It is the
-ass
blage of organic hiunan beinp-s" which t
„
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^ ^^ansxorms sequence and co-
existence into participation-. Oharcater is at once general and
distinguished. Katter and mind are characters of natural events;
the fo^er expresses their sequential order, and the latter the
’
their meanings in their logical connections and dependencies!
Mind as a system of meanings is quite consistent with Peweyls premises
Dewey’s definition of. mind is similar to that of
Dean
-.loodbridge in that both regard mind as contextual and nersistent
e-nd consciousness as focal and transitive.®® Although thinkers at
.ol.unoia have indicated that the thought of Dewey and that of
em-
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V/oodlDridge are similar, no definite investiga^tions have been made.
Therefore, it v/ould be of interest and in pla.ce to maJce a. brief
comparison.
Dewey;
1.
Hind: -- "ITind is contextual
and persistent .. .Hind is struc-
tural, substantial. . .Hind is a
constant luminosity." (66)
To denote the characteristic
of mind .... organization, order,
coherence. (67)
It is objective be-
cause it is conditioned by ob-
jective partia^lities and defec-
tions and made real by objective
stituations and completions
.( 6S
)
2.
Ilnowledge : -- "Idle epistem-
ology" .
3.
Consciousness :
--Dewey, like
V/oodbridge takes consciousness
as an idea. It is "that phase
of a system of meanings which
at a given time is undergoing
redirection, transitive trans-
formation." (69)
4. Ideas;-- "Or, v/e may be
aware of meanings, may achieve
ideas, that unite wide and en-
during scope with richness of
distinctions." (70) "Immediacy
of existence is unknovm and
unknov/able •
"
5. Body-mind;-- Experience
testifies that "mind- body is
an integral whole." (71)
yoodbridge;
1. Hind: --’.Then we deal with the
mind, v/e are dealing, not with a
j
place or an event, but with a
re8.1m(72) The realm of being
as known is thus characterized (74)1
by a certain unity and coherence. I
It is so because"experi-
ence is a matter of space and
time, of objects, qualities and
relations, it is a.lso a matter
of implications and inference .
"
( 75
)
"Hind as logical struc-
ture is objective. By affirming
its objectivity we mean that it
has to do with the make- ip of the
world in which we think," (76)
2. IDio;7ledge;--"’;/liat is so often
called epistemology is not legi-
timate." (77)
3. Consciousness: -- "Ideas a,re ex-
pressed in propositions. .The variet;
of the forms of their expression
and communication is innumerable."
(78) "It is rather that through
this interaction there are ideas
;
and that they are expressed and
that they are communicated." (79) ;
4. Ideas ;-- "Ideas are acquired."
(80) "Getting knowledge, v/e re-
'
peat, is not getting existence
|
at first hand or at second hand.
It is "getting ideas". (81)
(Dewey’s "realism without monism
or dualism".)
I
5. Body-mind;-- So many bodies
:
are so many minds.
Existence is not to be knov/n at first hand. It is
apprehended in ideas and in meanings. Both Dewey and Woodbridge
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would say that ideas and aeanings occur whenever there is "commu-
nication” and "translation" or "conversation". Interaction, com-
munication, tre-nslation are terms which denote the process ?/hereby
we have knowledge and meaning. In a private converation Dewey
said that his theory of meaning and mind may be summarized under
82
the name of "social behaviorism". He does not go all the way
with nominalism. The conditions of organization must not be neg-
lected if a "genuine community of action" is to be established.
85
"This community of partaking is meaning." This is what Dewey
means by "social behaviorism". Meaning is universal and objective,
capable of particular application. It is a "concrete universal"
because things are seen in its connections with the rest of ex-
perience. This may be said to be v/hat Robinson calls meaning as
84
universal, throu.gh which the traits of being are defined. Mean-
ing "is a realm of mind" as mind is a system of meanings.
3. The individual.
Every system of philosophy attempts to avoid the
charge of subjectivism. The personal factor, or personal experi-
ence ought to come in if philosophy is to give a comprehensive
interpretation of all experience. Although he tries to dispose
of the personal factor in e3q)erience casually, his use of "social
category" and his experience philosophy make constant demand for
the placing of the individual. Man is a part of nature; there-
fore all his activities fall within nature. He appears on the
highest level of life thus far in the life-process. As he is part
of the syst^ capable of communication, he is one of the foci of
the world-energies or events, and one of the participants in the
reality of the whole. His being consists of what he persists
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in doing. As a functional unit, he shares the spontaneity and
weal and woe of the v;hole. The consciousness attributed to him
is hot to be taJcen as distinct entity v;hich belongs to a separate
noumenal vrorld. CJonsciousness is an a.pparent function of the in-
dividual in his adaptation to environment at a tentional situation.
Dewey says that the modern history of thought finds its termina-
tion in "Royce’s "Community of selves", an empirical fact, from
86
which thought ought to start. • This assertion of Dewey is not
new, as we find it expressed in Both James and Bovme. Bovme says,
it is with "the person and social world in which we live ...( that
)
87
all speculations must begin."
After giving a genetic account of the individual,
Dewey summarizes others points which he calls "evident", the
88
substance of which follows:
1. That an individual, possessed of some mode and degree
of organized unity, participates in the genesis of
every experienced situation, whether it be an object
or an activity, is evident.
2. That this activity of participation affects the situ-
ation experienced is evident.
3. That this activity affects the environment, which in
turn affects the active agent is also evident.
4. That every form of life in the higher organisms of
life constantly conserves some consequences of its
prior experiences is also evident.
5. That the constancy and pervasiveness of the operative
presence of the self as a determining factor in all
situations is also evident.
6. That this presence is more intimate and omnipresent
in experience than the air we breathe, is also evident.
Until we understand the operations of the self as the tool
of tools, the means in all use of means, specifying its differ-
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ential activities in tlieir distinctive consequences in varying
qualities of what is experienced, science is incomplete and the
39
use of it is at the mercy of an unknov/n factor.
Dewey says that it is difficult to convey in speech
'•the nature of awareness of meaning", or consciousness, hut that
90
one may "evoke an 8-ctual experience of thing in question",
Descartes in interpreting experience sahd, "Gogito ergo sum".
He was right, ./e may add, I think, therefore I am active, and
therefore I am. This instantly takes us back to the principle
common to both empirical idealism and pragmatism; A thing is
when it is active. But in what sense is the individua,! a mind?
In comparing consciousness with mind, Dewey says that different
categories must be used to denote the characteristics of mind;
"organization, , order, and coherence". But there is a "continuum"
between mind as a "containing system of meaning" and consciousness,
momentary, focal, and urgent meanings. The individual, as we have
seen, possesses organized unity, participates in the genesis of
every experienced situation, determines the course of events,
conserves values, and forms ideals, Heaning in both its focal
and transitive form and its contextual and constant system finds
its unity in the individual.
G
. Sumnary
Dewey’s conception of metaphysics, on the surface, seems
to be a limited one. He says metaphysics "begins and ends Avith
91
analysis and definition," However, analysis and definition
give not only the "ground-map" for "criticism", but lead also to
the crucial problems of metaphysics.
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As to the content of the metaphysics of his experience-
92
philosophy, like Bucliner’s monism of ma.tter, Spencer’s monism
93 94
of force, Haeckel's monism of substance, Dewey’s monism of
’'ineffable event” (natural) is fundamental. However, in spite
of his strenuous effort to eradicate the historica.l dualisms,
he seems to have a realm of meaning distinguished from the realm
of existence. Existence itself has a duality of character; the
precarious and the secure, and the contingent and the permanent.
His naturalism is more comprehensive than the atomistic, the
mechanistic, and even the energistic, for it is an attempt to
interpret the process of creative evolution as a ”na,tural synthesis.”
His naturalism, we believe, is well termed evolutionary.
It is at once metaphysical and positivistic. It is mets^ilisycal
because he vigorously attempts to analyze and define the traits
of existence. It is positivistic because the categories of science
are taken as final in the interpretation of existence and teleo-
logy, and the spirituality of beings are denied,
De'vvey’s interests in life are so Vvide that when inter-
preting experience, he is metaphysical in his thinking; when
thinking of remedying social ills, he is positivistic. But in
both cases, he is quite intellec tualistic in his approach. His
naturalism may be called evolutionary in that a denotative method
is used and in that a "genetic continuity” is to be established.
To use the denotative method is to point out hov/, when, and v^here
a thing has arrived. Description includes explanation. To des-
cribe the levels of matter, life, and mind is to explain the life-
process. nothing is ultimate except this process of growth.
I *% ,**'
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Ghpater IV
COITGIPTIOITS 0? :iXPiriI3LTCS ALTD THZIR SUGCSSS
III 30LVIIT0 OLD PROELIillS
A. Experience and Dualisms.
Modern philosophy since Kant seems to have marched
toward the "fertile valley of experience". Though there are
divergent excursions, the "sure march" in the main has "been
"back to experience". ,/e have reviewed the tendencies and gen-
eral atmosphere of the philosophical situation of America since
1870 and have seen that during the last half century there vfas
a period of creative productivity, "Life is deeper than logic"
has been the slogan of practically all schools of thought. Let
us refresh our memory by referring again to some of the contem-
porary systems; the "radical empiricism" and pragmatism of Lames
and the "transcendental empiricism" and personalism of Bowne,
the "ultimate empiricism" (Professor Hocking^ s term) and absolute
idealism of Royce. All of them aim to interpret experience.
Both James and Bov.ne are spiritualistic, "flirting" v/ith realism,
while Hoyce is idealistic with a "natura-listic and empirical
1
flavor". To find out^what experience is and wha,t it means is
a common denominator of contemporary philosophies. Dewey says
that it is a worthy aim to adhere to experience, but experience
must not be viewed from the introspectice psychologist’s stand-
2
point. Rather does experience denote whatever happens in this
3
natural and social world in which vre live.
Dualism in the general sense indicates "toute
doctrine qui, dans un domains ditermini, dans une question donni.
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quelle qu’elle soit, admet deux principes essentielleiient irreduci-
4
bles.” Our usage of the term is neither strictly- psychological
nor metaphysical in our interpretation of Dewey's thought. Vvlien
Dev/ey uses the term, dualism, he seems to have in mind those
partial "pretensions”. For instance, the logiciajis and mathe-
maticians, the sensationalists and the scientists a.ll have their
o'm pretensions. "Then is just the time to be most vigorous in
insisting upon the necessity of reference to 'experience' in order
5
to fix the import of mathematical and logical pretensions." In
Dewey's Introduction to the Essays in Experimental Logic we find
a resolution that is similar to that of James and Bov/ne and Peirce;
naraely, to scrutinize terms and to be experiential. They are more
crucial for Dewey, since they afford a "recovery of philosophy"
Vvhereby all "persistent problems of philosophy" may be solved
or dissolved.
[e have seen the dualisms y/hich Dewey has brought
forward and attempted to dissolve or to bridge over. iTow it is
our task to see v^hether these dualisms have really been disposed
of or whether they are simply hidden av/ay and may reax:ipear in a
new garment.
1. The real jind the ideal.
In our exposition of the relation of the real and
the ideal, we have seen that Dev/ey distinguishes the tra,ditional
view of the ideal and the modern view of it as a difference of
talcing the ideal to be an eternal pattern ready-made in the noumenal
world and of using it as a, created or x)rojected instruiTient for
action. The ideal is ins brunental
. The real affords the situation
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upon v/hicli the ideal v/orks. The actual is a dynamic situation of
experience, a strugsle, in Dewey’s words. The actual is more
than a static imperfection. Any x^^oblematic situation necessitates
a revision and redirection of the course of activities. Ideals
cannot he isolated from the actual. They are the possibilities
of the actual, not existences of a separate realm. As a plan of
action, an ideal implies the unity and continuity of the social
situation. Pacts, Dewey says, are only partial ideas. Ideals
are their completions. The real and the ideal are in one con-
tinuous process, since both facts and ideals come v/ithin the
realm of thought. In this process of initiation and intentional
direction of exr^erience the hedonistic, volitional, and intellec-
tual factors are equally recognized. The real and the ideal are
two aspects of one continuous experience.
In his emphasis upon the activity of the creative
process in which the actual is dynamic and the ideal is the real-
ization of the possibilities of the actual, Dewey has made a
contribution to the attempt to relate and unify these two anti-
thetical phases of exijerience. The real and the ideal are sepa-
rated only when they are not viewed in action. They are connected
and continuous only in a mind, as a system of meanings. His
solution of the problem also affords due recognition to the feel-
ing and intentional character of life. The ideal is not exclusive-
ly 'em intellectual concept, a ready-made pattern. It is a real-
ization of the actual of the feeling and intentional asxDects
of experience.
Dewey’s interest in both these contributions is to
bring about continuity of activity between the real and the ideal.
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It is ,/ith regard to the nature of this activity that we may
question De'wey’s position. .Then he says that we are obligated
to choose and to go on, he nay be interx^reting tha.t obligation
as either a natural determinism or as the "categorical impera.tive "
.
Tie v/avers between these two. lie is interested in bringing about
continuity of activity. The genetic account of the past and the
instriraentalism for the future are not enough to establish con-
tinuity in the philosophical sense. By a "philosophical sense"
we mean an exrjlanation which is more than a psychological account
of the close relation between feeling and idea or actual and ideal.
The real or actual is nothing unless it is the present. .vTiatever
is to be established in this world must be done in the idea-world.
Dewey is right in saying that the idea is the guide of action,
for thus he brings the theoretical idea into relation v/ith the
antual. But this is not all: "Tly world extends in time and not
in space only: and as memory £ind prudence accompany the \/idening
of my v/orld in its time-extent, I interest myself in possible
6
values, not alone in actual values." But this theoretical "idea"
or "ideal" is manifested fully through a rational control in the
variety of ijossible action: "Yes, but not now; Yes, but not mine",
Dewey elsev/here tells us that a being v/hich can form reasonable
expectations is capable of achieving ideas and possesses intelli-
7
gence. The actual is limited and arbitrary, vvhile in the ideal
v;orld, there is freedom and new creation. It is not only in idea
we forecast the future, but also in it v/e know our experience.
Dewey lias told us that a keen state of enjoyment is achieved by
a state of high mental activity; the resources of memory and in-
vention are loosened, and the mind becomes a free, extensive, yet
f\
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enduring field or system of meanings for quick and accurate con-
nections powerfully focused. In other r/ords, the real and the
ideal are connected in activity, in the activity of a being ca-
pable of universalizing the particulars, or forming ideals.
2. Sensationalism and rationalism.
The syntheses whereby Dewey has established con-
tinuity of the dua>lisms of thought and sense, of a priori and
a posteriori, and of percept and concept, which we have discussed
briefly in our investigation of his motives in formulating a new
philosophy of experience, we shall here evaluate in sui;imary
form. Has his interpretation of experience resolved the dualisms
and solved the old problems they created?
a. Sense and intellect: To overcome the fallacious
separation and the extreme emphasis of sensationalism and intel-
lectualism V7e need a cautionary and directive 7/ord, "experience".
Sensationalism points out only the ways of feeling or having
thingsj intellec tualisra the^ ways of knowing them. Sensationalism
reduces the intellect to sensations; intellec tualism transforms
reality into intellectual and logical forms. One may choose a
"revised empiricism", which includes all the ways of having and
knowing things, asserting "the finality and comprehensiveness
of the method of pointing, finding, showing, and the necessity
of seeing what is pointed to and accepting wha-t is found in good
8
faith and without discouit," Both matter and mind are characters
of events. ITeither alone is rea-lity or is able to point to a
world identical with it. Instrumentalism includes both the
activity of thought and the tensional situation. The life process
is a continuity within which sensation and thought are means and
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ends reciprocally for the intitiation ajid control of the on-going
experience.
It is true that instrumentalism includes both the
activity of thought and the tensional situation. But the nature
of the tensional situation is a primary question. By Dewey’s
Qvm definition events are unknown. Objects are events with mean-
ings. Meaning in its transitive or momentary form is conscious-
ness, constant and organized mind. Volcanoes, wars, battles,
hunger, thirst, may be taken as natural events. However, they
are also objects in the experienced world and as such are "events
’vith meanings", since all objects are in the realm of meanings.
All tensional situations and the experiencing and directing of
these situations must be in thought, in ideas. The situation
is both fact and intellectual apprehension. But facts o-re partial
ideas. Dewey’s position is here idealistic in that he msilces the
situation x^regnant with thought and recognizes the ideality of
nature in stating that facts are partial ideas.
The continuity of sense and intellect which Dewey
achieves in his formulation of experience-philosophy affords
nothing more than an exiDlcination of particular instances wherein
sense is the origin of the stimulus to action and intellect the
instrument of the response.
b. A priori and a posteriori: Dewey intends, as we have
seen in the section on his motives, to emphasize the regulative
and preferential aspects of thought, ’.Tlnat he fears is that the
notion of the a priori, may be misinterpreted as "a static endow-
9
raent lurking in the mind". This traditional notion of "static
endowment" contradicts modern science and the notion of activity
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and evolution. This criticisin is similar to the attach upon
innate ideas. Hind is functional. Thinhing occurs in a con-
textual situation. The starting-point of thought is the actually
problematic specific situation, v/here tension, interaction, com-
raunica.tion
,
and projection occur. Thought functions to transform
confusion, ambiguity, and discrepancy into illuiriination, definite-
ness, 8Jid consistency. Rationality is aii *' a.chievment " through
through observation and deliberation, auid experimentation v/ithin
the life process. Meaning, on the other hand, is objective, being
11
a mode of natural interaction. Meaning is universal. "It is
spontaneous end self-moving; therefore to call it a. priori is
to express a fact; but to impute the a priori character of the
12
generalizing force of meanings to reason is to invert: the facts."
In "natural interaction" of events, in meanings, there is then
a general order. Dewey has to postulate that "some sort of or-
ganization exists in experience" and that "experience is full of
13
inference." Mot the mind, but the total objective experience
possesses an apriori character in the "generalizing force of
meanings." The mode of organization of the interacting events
of experience also gives rise to the character of space and time.
Space and time with Dev/ey, as with Kant, are the conditions of
the possibility of experience. For Dewey they are a priori in
that they are natural modes of interaction. Time as "an order"
is chiefly an intellectual construction or arrangement. "Struc-
ture is a constancy of means, of things used for consequences,
14
not of things taJcen by themselves or absolutely."
Intelligence is creative not because it is a
or entelechy, but because it is a natural event which achieves
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its function insepa-rably from a problematic situation. Kotliing
is a priori in the sense that it is the creation of mind or a
form which mind imx)oses upon nature. Rather does the a x)riori
character of experience appear in the objective, natural life-
process, where natural modes of interaction ma,y be termed a. priori.
Dating and pla^cing a.re characteristics of the denotatibe method.
Therefore the organization of experience is not a priori in the
Kantian sense, but is a node of natural interaction which Dewey
recognizes as a priori, to be discovered a posteriori in ex-
perience. To be is "to be experienced as”. The a priori or-
ganization of nature exists then only as it is experienced a
posteriori. The dualism then disappears.
c. Percept and concept; Dev/ey tells us that "to per-
ceive is to acknowledge unattained iDossibilities; it is to refer
the present to consequences, apparition to issue, and thereby
15
to behave in deference to the connections of events.” ”Aa an
attitude, perception or awareness is predicative expectancy,
16
wariness.” He compares the relation between nerceotion and
17
conception v;ith that of consciousness and mind. The perceptua.1
data afford distinctive properties of emotion, sensation, thought,
or desire. The misunderstanding of perception, Dewey says, derives
from the two meanings of perception. The one refers to perception
as a relation between natural events; the other as a case of
knowledge where we are concerned v/ith the "difference between an
object as a cause of knov/ledge ajid an object as knov/n, and hence
18
in relation to a mind.” More specifically, he tells us that
the 'Very things that, from the stajidpoint of perception as a
natural event, are conditions that account for its happening are,
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from the standpoint of perception as a case of knowledgei part
of the object v/hich, if knowledge is valid, ought to be knovm,
19
but is not." According to him, then, perceptions as natural
events are not in ajiy "intelligible or verifiable" sense kno'vvn.
20
They afford conditions for inference. Once perception in this
"natural" form enters into operative experience, it becomes "a
case of knov/ledge", as it is intellec tualized in the process of
experiencing. Perceptions become intellectual habits or ideas.
21
They may be called "automatic modes of cognition". Here we
find the inseparability of perception and conception.
Revision ftnd redirection are necessary as soon as
novel factors come in. In this revision, intelligence or ideas
are necesso.ry instruments. Ilemory as a fact of consciousness is
important, but it is not a faculty. Og course in this process
of transofrming the perceptual data into conceptual thought,
intention, effort, and imagination are important as ?/ell as the
instrui'ients (ideas). They are, however, included in intelligence.
Starting from the biolo.^ical viev/ of mind, Dew'ey, as other prag-
matists, is concerned -uith the process of knowledge not as a
relation of the idea and object, but as an act wherein idea is
a significant instruiiient for conduct. To the problem of know-
ledge we shall return in the following section.
Perception is one of the most outstanding "persistent
problems of philosophy". Vidmt we aim at here is Dev/ey’s reflection
on the relation of the perceptual data and the conceptual thought.
If continuity is to be established, the notion of change must
be made clea.r. Bergson holds that it is almost impossible to
think change pour "habitude statique de notre intelligence."
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Dewey holds that things in their ininediacy, the heoning a.re unlcno'.m
and unlcno'.yahle for they have nothing to do v/ith knov/ledge. The
perceptual data in themselves are unknown. V/e agree with Devyey
that the continuous changing character of events is something here
found in the- perceptual data of immediate experience, hut that
everything known is interaction vyhere events have becomes objects,
events with meanings. Change is grasped only by and in the mind.
Dewey is more intellectualistic and less physical in his con-
ception of idea than is M. Bergson. The former points out that
experience is full of inference, whereby ideas find their con-
nections. '.'/e also agree with him that reasoning or thinking is
a form of communication and consequently a process. In this
process the "situation” and its projection are continuous only
in mind, for mind by definition is "contextual" and a system of
meanings, a dynamic system,
V/e may turn against Dewey one of his criticisms of
philosophy. He warns us against following a form or system
simply because it is old and comforting. The emiDhasis upon the
biological concei^tion of mind has come to be such a form. Dewey
fears to lose sight of the biological organism lest mind will
lose its concreteness. However, since the biological conception
of mind engenders so many problems and runs up against so many
contradictions, why not run the risk of turning to a new road?
Experience is the final court of appeal. Our daily experience
is more conceptual than perceptual. It is more pertinent to ask
for the origin of ideas than to try to connect concepts which are
made distinct for practical reasons.
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3, Summary and evaluation.
The motive of hrin^ing about a synthesis of the
dualisms of existing systems of thought for the sake of a better
interpretation of experience is related to the geners.l acceptance
of the evolutionary point of view. The genetic method is preju-
dicial to the finding of continuity, iiot duality of the real.
Dewey’s interestlin the practical application of philosophy
and his instrumentalism tend tov/a.rd the rejection of the his-
torical dualisms.
a. Solutions of old dualisms; In the on-going of experi-
ence the real and the ideal, sense and intellect, the a priori
and the a posteriori, percept and concept, are merely various
foci of a continuous experience. The existential “lualities a.nd
their meanings coincide in experience. Every meaning implies the
actualization (in interaction) of natural events. Continuity is
established by viewing reality as change, which in turn implies
activity. But distinctions are necessary in any discourse, as
duality is implicit in thinking. Reality is the entire history
or growth process. The eventful character of existence reflects
the doing-suffering-ongoing experience. Distinctions are "experi-
enced distinctions"; they are reflective. Those historical dualisms
are objectionable to Dewey only when they are taken to be ultimate.
Dewey says that there is always a dual aspect in every experience,
and it is a practical matter, "Our words", he says, "divide into
names which are not (strictly speaking) terms at all, but which
serve to remind us of the vast and vague continuum, select oortions
22
of which only are designated by words as teims."
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Dewey repeatedly uses the existence of language as an
evidence of the nature of meaning and experience. Language,
moreover, indicates the constituents and hinds of experience,
political, social, moral, and religous. In this matter Bergson
is more convincing than Dewey. "L’idee du changement est la,
veux bien, raais elle se cache dans la p6nombre. Sn pleine
je le^lumi^re il y a le dessin iiirnobile de I’acte suppose accompli...
Ajectifs et substantifs syrabolisent done des "^^tats. Mais le
verbe lui-merae, si I’on s’en tient a la pa.rtie ^clairee de la
23
representation qu’il evoque, n' exprime giiere autre chose.”
finally, he goes on to deal with the problem of idea-connections
or continuity. Dev/ey tells us that terras are naines or designated
portions of the vague continuiun. How are these ideas connected?
Bergson, though not without hesitation, tells us that the con-
nection is in the personal factor, which universalizes and parti-
cularizes the //specific” and the "general” processes of change.
Thus we have continuity, Dewey goes a long wa.y around to evade
the individual factor. The irmnediacy of existence is unknovm.
Things knov/n are in interaction, hence in activity or in meanings.
Meanings have their origin in communication and continuity. How
satisfactory this solution is we shall consider in the following
paragraphs,
b, ITew problems generated: One may question whether
Dewey has escaped a dua,lism of the two fundamental metaphysical
concepts, events and objects, Ti^rery existence is an event.
Hvents are unique. They have no relation with knowledge. Objects
are events in interaction and have character and meaning. Are
events and objects, then, two kinds of experience or two aspects
of experience? As events have no relations, they must be independ-
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ent. Objects are contextua.l with, infinite rela.tions and infer-
ences and implications, --hence meaning. Gan each event in the
sense of a "pure" existence be said to be experience? Dewey
would say no. He says, "ITo experience having a meaning is
24
possible v/ithout some element of thought." Thought, then, is
constitutive in experience. Reality "had" and reality "knov/n"
constitute a dichotomy of "apprecia-tion" and "reflection", which
remains in Dewey’s philosophy. The resolution of this dualism
Dewey has suggested in his statement that every appreciation
has a "judgmental" element and no experience has a meaning with-
,
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out some element of thought. But on the other hand we are
told that "appreciation" is "invaluable (reflection cannot be
applied) emotional satisfaction" and "reflection" has nothing
to do with the "ineffable immediacy of existence". This leads
us to an examination of Dewey’s theory of knowledge and of value,
and their relation.
B. Experience and Knowledge.
The theory of knowledge in the experience-philo-
sophy of the pragmatic type is generally known as the functional
theory of knowledge. Truth is tested by its capability of satis-
fying needs and by its fruits. This theory may be summarized by
the phrase of "intended agreement". That is to say: "An experi-
ence is a knowledge if in its quale there is an experienced dis-
tinction and connection of two elements of the following sort:
one means or intends the presence of the other in the same
fashion in which itself is already present, while the other
is that which, v/hile not present in the same fashion, must become
•
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so present if the meaning or intention of its companion or jolce
26
fellov/ is to he fulfilled through an operation it sets up,”
Similarly, the process of experience or of con-
sciousness goes on the same way, as an organic relation of the
real and the ideal, of perception and conception. The pragmatist’s
logic is experimental in that knov/ledge is inherent in the em-
pirical and metaphysical connections in the process of growth or
experience, Tfithin this process the logical forms and structures
a.re made distinct for practical manipulation. Consciousness is
the meaning of events in the course of remaking, pjid so also is
knov/ledge, which is not a matter of grasping reality. Continuity
is best understood by a genetic account of the life process.
Matter, life, and mind are to be viewed as a continuous process,
"Personality, selfhood, subjectivity, are eventual functions
that emerge with complexity organized interactions, organic and
27
social,” Therefore knowledge is itself included in our
world of objects.
1, Epistemology and instrumentalism.
Dewey attacks epistemology for two reasons: it is
28
an "idle” pursuit and it brings us to "intellectual lock-jav/”.
This may be said to be at once the "excuse” for the pragmatists’
revolt and for their willingness to abandon the "persistent"
problems of philosophy. One of Dewey’s strategies is the "flank-
ing movement" just mentioned. Generally speaking, it is a revolt
against absolutism either in the realistic or idealistic form.
He says that instrumentalism "was a critical reaction to the
work of . .
.
.post-Kantian logicians .... The aim was to show tha.t it
is not necessary to assume a priori forms of thought to which
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subject-matter is accomodated."
\7hat are some of the problems or inquiries which
he regarded as idle?
1. How does one sort of existence purely mental
or immaterial have valid reference to a total-
ly flifferent kind of existence, material or
spatial?
2. How can the mental receive impressions from
the physical? Generally speaking, how is
knov/ledge possible?
3. That are the limits of knowledge?
4. How is the validity of knowledge established?
The follov/ing new concepts Dewey has substituted:
1. I'jiowledge is power, an instrument for control.
2. A change is to be made from contemplative
to operative knowledge.
3. A theory of knowledge is to find the best way
to know "economically, liberally, and effectively."
From the above analysis vie find two diverse objec-
tives. The objective of the historical epistemological interest
is to make a "critical" study of the problems concerning knowledge
itself; what other value it may cash in is a secondary question.
But this question of the relation between man and his cosmos is
to magnify "the work of intelligence in our actual physical and
30
social world." The instrumentalist says that a theory is not
complete if it stops at a declaration of anything’s being rea.lly
and eternally and thoroughly ideal and rational. There is a law
or demand of specification. Te agree with him that every endeavor
must be purposeful. A mere ideal is sterile.
^^Obj ects
Ideas^^^^
Conduct
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Dev/ey has said tine and aga,in that an unexanined life
is not worth living, "Criticism” is crucial for realizing and wid
widening values. "How to make ideas clear" is the kernel of
the pragmatic movement; therefore it is legitimate to scrutinize
the terms, propositions, and judgments in their practical rela-
tions or applications, which may he termed epistemology. James
is right when he says that pragmatism is a new name for old v/ays
of thinking. The traditional epistemology does not pretend to
solve all the problems of philosophy, but it is primary and
fundamental. To supplement it there are other branches of philo-
sophy, ./hat differentiates instrumentalism from epistemology
is its attempt to combine epistemology with ethics and axiology,
Ilontague is right when he cla.ssifies epistemology with logic under
methodology, the importance of which we need not repeat here.
It would be interesting to see how far Dewey has kept away from
traditional epistemology.
The best place to look for his exposition of instru-
mentalism, we believe, is in his ZCxperimental Logic . "The thesis
of the essays", he declared, "is that thinking is instrumental
to a control of environment, a control effected through acts
31
which would*not be undertaken ... .without thinking." It is not
idealistic because it does not stop at "an otiose affair" of pure-
ly intellectual enquiry; it is idealistic in so far as objects
of knowledge in their distinctive character as objects of know-
ledge are determined by intelligence. "Faith in the constructive,
the creative, competency of intelligence was the redeeming element
32
in historic idealisms," Dewey also forewarns us that his posi-
tion in these essays is "frankly realistic in acknowledging that
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certain brute existences, detected and laid bare by thinking
but in no way constituted out of thought or any mental process,
set every problem for reflection and hence serve to test its
33
otherwise merely speculative results.”
iCnowledge is power in that it interprets the actual
and projects the ideal. Furthermore, Devrey tells us that the data
of knowledge, strictly speaking, are not objects but means, ins-
trumentalities of knov/ledge. They are things through which we
know rather than things known. "Dev/ey is after all espistemologic
34
ally minded”, as Lovejoy has told us!
}Toreover, Dewey has himself said that a theory of
knowledge is closely related with metaphysics, since instrumental
ism recognizes the objectivity of meaning and of data. "Data in
their fragmentary character pose a problem; they also define it.
They suggest possible meanings. ".Vhether they indicate them as
well as suggest them is a question to be resolved. But the mean-
ings suggested and the problem described by the data cannot be
solved without their acknowledgement and use genuinely and existen
35
tially suggested....” Formally and materially Dewey comes back
to the traditional problems of epistemology .with whatever interest
he may have. So much for the general review.
The traditional theory of knowledge fails because
it is not synoptic nor empirical. A theory of knowledge in the
sense of how to know most "economically, liberally, and effective-
36
ly", demands a teclinique of instructive and rewarding inquiry.
To achieve this, the empirical situation is necessarily taken
into account, Dewey says that contemporary idealism is close
to his position because it treats thought or reason as constitu-
r
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tive of experience by neans of uniting and constructive functions.
In the course of our investigation, we have seen that inference
is a ceaseless activity in life. Its supreme function is a media-
tion in the transformation of the blind, uncertain, ajid the pro-
blematic to the comparatively clear, sa.fe, and smooth continuum,
which is the process of life. The intervention of the organism
is blind and at random, but intelligence in the form of thinking
recognizes the complexity of the situation, inferring what is
likely to happen, and projects ideals for efficient control,
linowledge, then, is a memorandum of the appearance of qualitative
38
events, concerned with sequence, co-existences, and relations.
This is what Dewey calls, "logical problem of knowledge". This
is legitimate. Then, the difference between Dewey’s epistemology
and the traditional one is this:
^^bj ects
^Obj ects
3ubj ec
t
Dewey * s Traditional
Dewey’s theory of knowledge, then, is a relation be-
tween objects. It is a "realism without monism or dualism".
Under whatever form it may appear, the problem of knowledge, in-
cluding the main traditiona,! problems and the new emphasis, is
"there". "How to conduct doubt profitably" is the purpose rather
than the teclinique v/hich Dewey tells us is so important. Is it
not a partial statement to say that the object of knowledge is cheif-
ly it’s objective? T/e agree with the statement that pragmatism
in the instrumentalistic form has made empirical idealism clear
and viQ also agree that pragmatism has made it even more intensive-
ly experiential, but it is not inclusively so.
<i
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2. experience and anti-intellec tualisra.
Since 1870, experience-philosophy has "been winning
marvelously. However much the conquerors have disagreed in their
systems as a whole, in respect to their emphasis upon experience
and their attack upon traditional intellectualism they agree. The
intuitionisra of Bergson, the radical empiricism of James, the
"transcendental empiricism" of Bowne, Royce’s "absolute" pragma-
tism, and Dewey’s instrumentalism, are the labels v/hich indicate
their agreement.
Dewey maices rationalism synonymous with abstract intel-
lectualism. The characteristics of this, as described by him,
may be briefly stated thus: the first presupposition is a "faculty
of reason" with v^hich mind is endowed. It belongs to the noumenal
world and has nothing to do with practical affairs of history.
It gives a priori forms of thought. These forms are "ternal
patterns" so to speak, ".fhen the action of different persons conform
39
to these forms, their activities find forinal accord and consistency.
He says he is anti-intellec tualistic in the sense that he holds
such a position to be groundless. The work of the intellect must
be judged by its function in actual experience.
The platform of instrumentalism is clearly stated in
Dewey’s comments on Montague’s discussion of "The Method of Prag-
matism" in The V/ays of ICnowing
. There he not only points out
what is true of instrumentalism, but also what is not true. Ins-
trumentalism holds that it is not necessary to assume a priori
forms of thought and that logical forms and structures a,re dis-
tinctions within the process of reflective and experimental inquiry.
Instrumentalism regards action as the way to have
!•
t
121
needs satisfied. The esthetic, moral and scientific needs are
a continuous development, of the practical needs, and thought is
the means for non-practical consequences. Both the practical
and the non-practical are simultaneous and successive in experi-
ence. ICnowing and thinking do not constitute the whole of ex-
perience; therefore experience is not primarily Icnolwegde. In-
tellectualism would take all experiences as having their mean-
ings in the intellectual sphere.
Instrumentalism takes knowledge to he connected with
the empirical and the metaphysical, since knowledge has an in-
trinsic relation with the actual and the ideal in the achievement
40
of consequences. Knowing is only a mode of experience, in-
trinsic to it. It is not all of experience. Intellec tualism
starts v/ith the premise of a faculty of reason endowed in mind
and concludes that knowledge may he isolated from the empirical.
Let us take a synoptic view of the various factors
in Dewey's methodology with respect to the notion of intellect.
Ke definitely and repeatedly says that what he objects to is the
isolation of knowledge from its empirical and metaphysical con-
nections, which is a result of certain theories about intellect,
’./hat are these theories? They are panlogism, abstract intellec-
tualism, and sensationalism. These theories make intellect as
logical structures "nothing but" "eternal ideas", or various
arrangements of atoms or sensations. Pragmatism regards sensa-
tion or sentiment as the initiation and sustaining situation for
practical needs; ideas or ideals as their guide. They are con-
tinuous in the process of growth; therefore the contemplative is
to be changed to operative; the ideal of truth for truth's sake
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is to be supplanted by the Baconian ideal of knowledge as a means
of practical control of material conditions.
V/hat is the origin, then, of the opposition between
intellec tualism and pragmatism in general and Dev/ey’s instrumen-
talism in particular? The conflict occurs in a struggle between
"geneticism" and idealism. Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics , 'Jilliam
James* Reflex Action and Theism , and Hooking’s Meaning of God in
Human Lgxoerience indicate the fallacy of both intellec tualism and
the fallacious pretensions of geneticism. The interest in the
genesis and in the functioning of the biological and psychological
aspects of life is as empirical and practical as the interest in
establishing objective truth. The former without the latter is
incomplete; the latter without the former is grouiidless. Montague
has passed a good criticism on the partiality and dogmatism of
each of these pretensions: "This confusion of the genesis of a
belief with its truth and of the genesis of a virtue with its
41
value is morally dangerous as it is intellectually fallacious."
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3. Gonclusion
The first thins for us to rememher as a result of
our investigation is the chief transference from the epistemological
problem proper to a problem of conduct; that is, from the subject-
idea-object relation to that of situation-idea-consequence. There
we find at once a contribution and contradiction. The contribu-
tion is found in the emphasis of the function of knowledge and its
implications in the continuity of life. The contra,diction is
evident in that Dewey declares the. epistemology proper to be idle
and yet he is constantly dealing with problems, as it seems to
me, equally remote from "orginary “ or "common" experience, if not
more so than those of historical epistemology. Since reason has
an historical affiliation with the abstract and static, Dewey
substitutes for it "inference", which is a constant activity of
life and of mind. Thus he has done much toward a more explicit
analysis of the process of thinking in all experiences. As we
have seen, he reverses the order of the notion of intrinsic and
instrumental values in the history of thought. ICnowledge is made
a relation between and object. The necessity of a subject-object
relation is avoided. Thus we have the form of "objective rela-
tivism", a new teclinique in epistemology. It is a difficult tech-
nique, which requires more "speculative audacity" and "more faith
in ideas".
This is the sta,ge upon which we have enetred and upon
which he is philosophizing, the stage of "esthetic, scientific, and
moral needs". Therefore, Dev^ey says, "How can instrumentalism
v/hich holds that intelligence is the only sure method of achieving
the good in consequences be anti-intellectualistic
. . . ? It is anti-
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intellectualistic only v/ith reference to certain theories about
intellect, theories which seem to me to isolate knowledge from
42
its connections, empirical and metaphysical." This indicates
an attempt at coherency.
\7e agree with him that in formulating a theory of
knowledge v/e must take into account the empirical situations a.nd
histories . and the metaphysical v/orld ground, a complete logic
of experience. But the account of the connections must he a
coherent one rather than a "genetic" one. In other v/ords, the
results of analysis and the continuity of the elements of experi-
ence no doubt afford better insight for the understanding of ex-
perience, but philosophy ought to go further to the meaning of
the whole. This Dewey does not do, for he openly gives up the
question of objective truth.
G. Experience and Value.
Axiology has been one of the great emphases in the
"philosophy of the recent past", among divergent schools and
systems of thought, one of which is pragmatism. The theory of
value is the hub of Dewey’s philosophy, a great contribution
to current thought. But "no one can hope to understand Dewey’s
theory of value", T. V. Smith tells us, "who does not grasp
rather fully the meaning that he attaches to the terra ’experi-
43
ence ’ "
.
1. The criterion of the theory of value.
jTliile Aristotle points out that man by nature
demands to know, Dev/ey lays stress on the end of knowledge: fai-
lure and success are great categories of life. "Our inalienable
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concern is v/itii good and bad, prosperity and failure, and hence
choice. 7/e are constructed to think in terms of value, bearing
upon welfare. The ideal of welfare varies, but the influence of
interest in it is pervasive and inescapable. .. .ITow this fact seems
to be of great importance for philosophy; it indicates that in
44
some sense all philosophy is a brauich of morals." Then, prag-
matism goes back to Kant and Lotze is evident. This making
morals fundamental is a common ingredient of empirical idealism
and pragmatism. This is certainly true to the spirit of 3o\7ne,
Sorley, as well as James.
The process of ideas calling forth v;illed activities
or conduct is moral experience. It is a pajrt and an important
part of experience as a whole, since there are constant and apparent
contradictions and incompatibilities demanding reconciliation.
'He bring experience into the realm of value when we consider and
evaluate the incompatible and discrepant ends. But it is in ex-
perience that we find "continuity" of the "mental" and the "overt"
and in activity we find continuity of the "outer" and the "inner" and
the "how" and the "what" of activity. One of these dualities
can neither be real nor significant apart from the other. Hence
a synoptic view of experience seems to be the criterion for prag-
matism, and social the supreme category. Dewey says, "The social
45
end is the rational end." 7/here, when, and how has this insight
arrived? His praise of the social implication in Kant’s "maxim"
is not of small significance. Dewey says, "he (Kant) insists
especially that the social relations of an act bring out its
general purport." He goes on to say that "a right end is one
which can be projected harmoniously into the v/idest and brandest
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survey of life wliich the individual can mak:e." ’That is the
source of the "rational end"? He makes use of the principle of
contradiction and asserts that goods or values are objective be-
cause they are interpenetrating and cajn be regarded as a "system
of nature". But he says that this principle of contradiction is
to point out a particular act, proposal, or suggestion as a por-
tion of a connected whole of life, and to make real to us that
no man, no act, and no satisfaction of ajiy man falls or stands
by itself. Idea is a process. Social is actual; the actual is
the rational I «Vhat aims to emphasize is the logical outcome of
true individualism. The social is the rational end; the rational
end is also the social end. But the crucial point is the harmony
and exoansion of the "capacities and desires of the self", as he
48
tells us, "in a cooperative whole". It is a misunderstanding
of Dewey’s position to neglect his attempt at coherence. He him-
self has told us that "comprehensiveness and consistency" ought
49
to be the criterion of value.
2. The continuity of judgment and value.
The key to the understanding of Dewey’s theory
of value lies in the understanding of the meaning he gives to
experience. The central point in Dewey’s theory of experience, as
we have seen, is to abolish dualisms and establish continuity.
Let us study the continuity of judgment and value. The table of
values in Dewey’s formulation is very simple. The i.'mnediate
values are possessed and enjoyed. These are "intrinsic values";
they "are not objects of judgment, a,nd they cannot (a.s intrinsic)
be compared, or regarded as greater and less, better or worse.
50
They are invalua/ole . " But v/hen choice is necessary, there is
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an order of |)references . "Things judged or passed upon have to
be estiraated in relation to sone third thing, some further end,
51
’,7ith respect to that, they are means or instrumental values."
This seems a reversion of the historical meaning of intrinsic and
instrumental. According to Dewey’s usage, the intrinsic is con-
verted into the instriunental upon its being evaluated. But when
a consumma.tion is reached, the instrumental returns "hone" again
to the intrinsic realm, w’hich is i:mnediately had and enjoyed.
The relation of judgment and value is of signi-
ficance then. 'Ye have just been told that judgment is determinator
in the occasion of choice or preference, and that it always refers
to a "third thing", namely, the end. Judgment or reflective
thought "is derivative and secondary" beca.use it has a humble
origin and it serves only as an instrument. "It comes after some-
52
thing and out of something, and for the sake of something."
Dewey is right v/hen he says that "the relation of thought to its
empirical antecedents and to its consequent ‘truth, and the rela-
tion of truth to reality" consitutes "the heart of the logical
53
problem". But the relation of judgment and value is our im-
mediate concern. Judgment is a practical affair; therefore it
is not complete in itself, but always "for the salce of" determining
v/hat it is to be done. This also implies that value is to be given
by future action, itself "conditioned upon (varying with) the
judgment". It is action which will actualize the potentia.l or
immediate values. Action is to be determined by the judgment.
Judgment or reflective thought, then, functions as a mediiun between
the immediate and its further actualization'.
Value, on the other hand, finds its realization

128
or transforma,tion in hunan values. Unless there is "occasion"
for desire, deliberation, decision, there is no value. Thinking
is a "na,tural event"; therefore desire, deliberation ojid choice
are not subjective ‘ohenomena. Reflection is a process v/herein
54
things get values.
3. Value auid teleology.
55
Values in the ’intrinsic" form are ’invaluable’,
but upon judgment in the act of choice, there emerges differences
of intrinsic and instrumental values, for judgment necessaitates
a "third thing, some further end". Intrinsic values are integral
"ingredients" of experience; each has sji "irreplaceable function
in experience"; hence no "heirarchy of values" in this sense can
be established. However, they may be treated as means for fur-
56
their ends. The logical question v/ould be as to the nature of
the "third thing" or the end.
"The act", Dewey says, "passes amay; but its
significance abides in the increment of meaning given to further
57
grov/th". To live in the ideal is to live in meaning, in the
recognition of the meaning of ants. In other words, to idealize
experience is not in vain; for new qualities are given to it
in consciousness, which it does not possess in actuality. In
connection with this, he says that time and memory ate true
artists; reality is becoming more real to the person with "freer
58
imagination" and "less controlled by concrete actualities". An
ideal is also recognition of the "final value" with its "unique
and inexhaustible" meanings of the special situations of our ex-
perience. Life, then, carries with it intrinsic values; it has
a great purpose to fulfill. Here, v/e see the great contribution
'T
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made by Dewey tliat after these are recognized, the task lies in
the realization of the specific values. The specific empirical
end is the social end, which is rational. The classical theories
all set up an ’'ultimate good” or end, and make it "co-extensive”
with all the rest of life’s significant concerns. The conversion
of the unavowed morals or wisdom into cosmology is one of the
great philosophical fallacies,
'^at, then, are some of the specific ends? Is there
any standard or categorical imperative? Dewey says, "So a^ct as
60
to increase the meaning of present experience,” But he warns
us not look for a general formula of progress for we shall not
61
knov/ where to look for it until we give up the search for it.
The moral issue occurs within nature; therefore it is more reasonable
to take the character of natural events as the basis for the inter-
pretation of morals. This reverses the order of the traditional
formulation: from morals to cosmology, and it contradicts the
pragmatic stand; ethics precedes metaphysics. The world is both
hazardous and stable; indicating neither sheer flux nor ultimate
permanence. The union of them is the condition of all experienced
62
s&tisfaction. Tlxperience classified under good or eveil are
only functions and distinctions within a growing self in a, chang-
63
ing 7/orld. But these differences have meaning only in judgment.
In spite of the fact that Dewey warns us not to
attempt to look for a general formula of progress, he postulates
a "social category” which is "to incorporate the physical, organic,
and psychological” and thereby the dualism of reducing the objec-
tivity oj. moral distinctions and judgments to private preferences
64
or to a transcendental entity will lose its meaning, Dewey says
i J
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that it is historical claim of philosophy that it occupies itself
v/ith the ideal of wholes and the whole. The social may not he the
whole, hut it is the widest ajid richest najiifestation accessible
to our observation, "It is this rinsing", T, V, Smith tells us,
"for man to live in his own world and this justification for his
so doing, that constitutes the essence of Devirey’s philosophy.
'.Thile other have cried ’lo, here; lo there]’, Dev/ey has insisted
66
that the kingdom of good is within human experience." But "the
meaning of <rod" is also to he found "in human experience", Dewey
has openly disregarded a philosophy of religion, hut when he docs
go into the problem, he is far less humanistic that his followers
would wish him to he, Dewey says, "The consciousness of this
encompassing infinity of connections is ideal.... It is a signifi-
67
cance to he felt, appreciated". The life of 'the cor.-imunity affords
a good symbol for the relation of the individual and the whole
which claims him and dignifies him. In the presence of religion
68
"we put off our mortality and live in the universal," Though
this consciousness cannot he intellec tualized, the "emotional
69
appreciation of it is won by those v/ho are v/illing to think,"
Smith’s statement, then, is overenthusiastic
J
Hdffding, in his Philosophy of Religion , makes
conservation of values the central axiom of religion. Horal
values and the idea of Crod are inseparable, Paith in a Being
as the creator and sustainer of values softens the outlines of
nature and affords "joyful emancipation" for the individual. A
few familiar lines may express the meaning of God in human ex-
experience:
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All day thy wings have fanned,
At that far height, the cold, thin atnosnhere.
Yet stoop not, v/eary, to the welcome land,
Though the dark night is near.
He who, from zone to zone,
guides through the boundless sky thy certain flip-ht,In the long way that I must tread alone,
'Jill lead my steps aright. (70)
4. Dualism of valuation and evaluation.
Distinctions of values are brought about by judgment.
Otherwise, values are intrinsic and invaluable. The issue, then,
lies in the question whether the discriminated values are real
values or not. He tells us that critical appreciation is the
cradle of values. Sven the ’religious’ values are to be won by
those who are willing to think. Tlie intrinsic values, then, are
immediately given in experience, and therefore they are objective.
In our evaluation, we realize the values implicitly given in ex-
perience. 'The intrinsic value must be viev/ed as a quality, a
potential quality; the perpetuated value is an "affair". Means
and fulfiLments have different qualities, but their difference
has nothing to do with the i^mnediacy or intrinsicalness of value-
quality. Hence, a dualism of valuation and evaluation or
appreciation ejid reflection’ Dewey thinks that he has solved this
dualism either when it is viewed as a constant rhythm "of perchings
and flights" or when it is included in the "infinite or zero"
experience.
5. Conclusion.
Axiology is inherent in the modern philosophy of
experience. This is more evident in pragmatism, especially in
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Dewey's thought. Methodologically, he attempts a coherence cri-
terion hut applies it imperfectly. The imperfection lies in the
over emphasis on the social at the expense of the personal, on the
here and the now the particular at the expense of the future,
and the more- tha^n-human values-- the universal. Metaphysically,
he is devotedly naturalistic and intellectualistic . The genetic
interest often leads him to piositivistic or dogmatic a priori
assumptions. He suffers from the "specialist fallacy". Experience
for Dewey is like the Absolute for Royce; in experience, as in the
Absolute, everything is found and explained. Axiologically, his
general position is close to G. E. Moore’s theory of value; i.e.,
systematic objectivity. It is a naturalistic objectivity. They
are similar on the basis that they both hold to the inseparability
of means and ends in a total value experience, that value, in the
intrinsic sense, is "indefinable", and that Moore's "organic
~ 72
whole or unity" is similar to Dewey's "organic continuity".
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Chapter V
THE GRITIQ,UE OF JOHN DE.7EY
A. General Evaluation.
To find what experience is and means is to philosophize
therefore the investigation into the meaning of experience is an
imperative discipline for students of philosophy. This investi-
gation is limited to the meaning of experience in the thought
of John Dewey. The primary task is expository, to be followed
imperatively and inevitably by a critical estimation. The former,
therefore, necessarily has involved research into all of Dewey’s
writings, and decision upon the most relevant passages from his
important works. As to the latter, we have three sources: the
history of thought, the critics of Dewey, and actual experiences
all consituting a court of a-x)peal.
The common claim of all philosophies is that their
office is the interpretation of experience. Therefore to estimate
the entire system of thought is to find the meaning of experience
in any philosophy. This is especially true with Dewey for the
reason that pragmatism is supposedly an experience-philosophy
and that Dewey’s interpretation of experience is known to be more
"novel" than any of his contemporaries, ’.Ve have made our excur-
sion and we have seen the "novelties", and we are ready to take
a synoptic view.
1. Kis contributions.
It is true that there are few new ideas, but there
are new emphases, whereby new meanings are created and discovered,
Dewey’s meaning of experience implies, first of all, some new
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emphases. • Pirst, we find the emphasis upon an inclusive view of
experience; i.e., all phases of experience must be accounted for.
True to the spirit of his age science is absolute Dewey
adheres to the denotative method so that everything may be genetic-
ally accounted for. Everything is suspected except that which
»
goes under the name of sciences. Under the law of denotation,
many facts which refuse to obey, are throvm away (exiled). It is,
however, a radical reform; philosophy is mdde to obey the same
common law. The methods .of science and 'philosophy are one.
Then, v/e find the empha:sis on continuity and activity.
Life is an active process; reality, is history in its entirety.
V/here there is life, there is experience. Living means experi-
encing, Experience suggests the whole diverse interacting ele-
ments of the objective world. Continuity and a.ctivity are in-
separable. This "objective v/orld" is ever becoming. In the
growth-process, Dewey shows us three plateaus of interaction or
three levels of life; Matter, life, and mind. This is no other
than the natural world in which we live, Man is one of the na-
tural objects; whatever he does is one of the natural events,
Ke is obligated to undergo-with the rest of the world. Therefore,
adaptation and adjustment are the dominant activities of man.
The higher the being is the more he controls the environment.
This natural world is wide enough for him to live in both the actual
and the ideal. This emphasis brings home the pessimistic touch,
the meliroistic ideal, and the humanistic tendency. Function
thereby becomes one of the chief categories. This has afforded a
great dynamic to the docial service cry during the last two decades.
The consequences of the emphasis on activity and con-
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tinuity is to connect the historical dualisms; if they cannot be
connected, they are to be abandoned. Dewey has done both. This
coup d’etat of the persistent problems of philosophy has made
philosophy more popular than heretofore. President Butler of
Goliunbia has described pragmatism as the common-sense philosophy,
"which, when unfolded to the man in the street, causes him to ho7/l
1
v/ith great delight, because he at last understands things." This
experience of "delightful emahcipa.tion" ha,s been shared even by
philosophers I But one needs to be reminded that this is only
a promise and a baitj Ho doubt, philosophy is brought much closer
to humanity than ever before. Philosophy serves as a critique
of civilization; the philosopher as a social servant. The notion
that every experience has intrinsic worth, supplies added force
for the argument of pluralism, social, moral, political, and
metaphysical.
The functional interpretation of experience goes
hand in hand with biological categories such as adaptation, adjust-
ment, control of environment, and meaning of life. These problems
constitute the corner stones of functionalism. This is a conse-
quence of the attempt to make use of scientific data as a basis
for philosophy. This, as Dewey has told us, constitutes the origin
of the new conception of experience, based upon psychology and
biology. One of the outstanding forms which holds this method
of interpreting experience is behaviorism. Behaviorism, of course,
is of several varieties. Dewey takes it chiefly as a methodology
rather than a metaphysical principle. He prefers to call his
position "social behaviorism", which is a combination of energism
and associationism. It is true that Dewey holds naturalism in the
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evolutionary form, but it is a philosophy of ideas, psychological
idealism or instrumentalism; a philosophy of activity, functional-
ism and axiology.
Things R,re held to be true because they are workable.
But mere workability is not all, Hov^ does it work ajid for what
end does it work? Let us point out the significance of this
position as a branch of morals shows us tha^t everything is a moral
one, in that it is an attitude, a preference, and a choice. These
moral activities are manifested upon critical judgment. The latter,
in turn, has its significandse in an actual or experimental situation.
The relation of experience and* intellect falls within one continu-
ous process.
"Appearance" have intrinsic v/orth; they are to be
saved. To do this one must abolish the dualism of appearance
and reality. This xiill not brought about if "reality" has "de-
grees", as in the idealistic position. Therefore there is a dire
necessity for the notion of immanence in the interpretation of
experience. This Dewey asserts very definitely, though at times
with great hesitation and precaution, V/hen he does assert it, a-s
he does most of the time, he certainly makes_ it more "concrete"
in that he is manifesting his speculative or teclinical interest,
and labors to establish a coherent metaphysics. This aspect of
Dewey s thought ceratinly has helped to make idealism more em-
pirical and clear, Tnis also justifies the constant v/arning given
to Dewey not to let the camel’s nose (idealism) come into his tent,
Dewey nolds the hypothesis that immanent meanings exist in conse-
quence of the repeated successful outcome of referential or evident-
ial meanings. This is stated in the light of his genetic interest.
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But existentially or metapliysically spealiins> experience is the
\7orld Crround, and values are intrinsic, that is, iinmanental.
Bewey, in place of teleology, lays stress upon "tendency" and
"or^anixation" . To realize them is to "sense" the "tendency",
and to articulate the organization, and to formulate delicate
technicality in order to control and to adapt human experience
to a far and wide environment of meanings. This environment
makes it possible to live in the ideal and in the universal,
where v/e find the intrinsic value of each individual and the
significance of each experience in the infinite whole, a community
of equally metaphysical beings.
The intrinsic character of Dewey’s thought, then,
is willingness to abandon insoluble problems and willingness to
think through problems relevant to human affairs. Dev/ey always
begins though not without the prejudice inherent in the finite
mind his philosophizing with a historical criticism, and quite
often he attempts to bring aboitt a synthesis of the seemingly
contradictory hypotheses. Reflection gives the meaning of the
thing; meanings are values. Perpetuated values are to be won by
hard work. In other words, the intelligibility of experience is
the problem of life pjid the problem of philosophy. Dewey’s con-
ception of art is very intellec tualistic in that it is a "criticism".
Religion, an emotional appreciation, is also meaningful only to
those who are "willing to think". ^That he objects to is abstract
view of life. The most inclusive end is the one v/hich is valid
for thought, right for conduct, and cultivated for appreci action.
Pragmatism, as a whole, then, has been more inter-
ested in a philosophy of life- and in philosophy as a critique of
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civilization th.an in anything else. This interest, as we have
seen in the course of our investigation, is expressed by Dewey
in his effort to combine empiricism (in the traditional sense)
and idealism, lloreover, his "imimediatism" often affords insight
to his social and ethical mysticism. If v/e view it sympathetic-
ally, we may find a. "philosophy of play" or "moral holidays".
This encourages a culture of leisure instead of idleness; affords
a place for the feelings, values, and ends (consummation) as well
as conduct, ideas, and the means of livings. Glass superiority
has no place in a democratic philosophy. Dewey emphasizes mean-
ing rather than mechanistic conventionality. The appreciation
of the "flower in the crannied wall" has its meaning only in
relation to other phases of experience.
2. ITew problems generated.
The value of most of the contributions of new
systems of thought often lies in the nevr emphases. The new em-
phasis may be at once a contribution in that it implies discovery
through insight and reorganization and creative activity in its
uniqueness, and a generation of new problems because emphasis often
travels with bias and prejudice and shifts the center of interest.
Dewey's new emphases are no exception; they give rise to many nev/
problems which are to be recognized, at least.
The great emphasis on continuity, in opposition
to dualisms and degrees of values and realities, necessitates an
inclusive category, experience. Experience must also be viewed
in its immediacy for duality or dichotomy is implicit in reflec-
tion. Immediate experience is a natural evolution where reality
is in its on-going. But reflective experience is a well establish-
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ed fact! Then, a dichotomy within experience! Dewey, then, eludes
very skillfully the trap in the front, hut he falls into the very
same trap from behind. This has to be answered by Dev/ey or his
able followers. Experience, in the inclusive sense, has am im-
plicit duality, at least riuali tative: imnediate and reflective
in Dewey’s fashion, or "enjoyed" and "contemplated", in Alexander’s
formulation.
Dewey refuses to project moral experiences into
cosmolo^iical metaphysics. On the contrary, he advises us to
look for the traits of the cosmos v/herein we find a clue to the
meaning of our life-problems. The characters of na-ture are at
once secure arid hazardous. Objects prior to reflections have
already fallen into certain groupings; but the predominant traht
of nature is its uncanny uncertainty. It is a scene of risk and
demands control.- Dewey, following the empirical denotation, sees
that objects have already fallen into certain groupings. If the
world is one of absolute risk and chaos, there is no risk at all,
for risk implies faith in the possibility of secureness. 7/hile
l^ragmatism emx)hasizes the necessity of examining life if it is
to be lived worthily, and of realizing the possible ideals implicit
in every empirical situation, nevertheless, it refuses to maJke
cUiy hypothesis as to the meaning and the end of the whole. The
failure lies in the neglect of the empirical demand for a teleo-
logical explanation of life. If life is worth living, and the
values of living are to be conserved, v/e need faith in a.n ultimate
prupose. Dewey has given us a description of nature but fails
to tell us its meaning. Values are planted and cultivated in
nature. Tnere are they conserved? They are created in shared
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experiences. '.Till they be conserved in society or in nature?
The challenge of 'Jilliam Jatnes ha,s been answered only partially.
Zbcperience is made an "absolute”, which demands
"respect" and "intellectual piety". Respect for experience affords
faith in its possibilities, where values are planted and culti-
vated and intellectual piety toward experience commands the direc-
tion of life and of toleration and cooperation among men, the
"centers of experience". Patronage, domination, and imposition
will disappear, giving place to a society of free persons. This
is a great moral and intellectual, and social idealism, has con-
siderable affinity with theistic idealism, but experience in its
IDresent form alone does not seem to be able to serve as the su-
preme category for reality. If the present form in its "common
sense" is the whole of reality, are we not in a vicious circle
when philosophy professes to interpret experience/ The cou:iten-
ance of the G-reat Centre of experience has been blurred by the
traditional apologetics and intellec tualistic speculation; the
appeal to experience certainly has served as a great challenge
to find the meaning of God and that of life in experience. Dewey
says that we must conceive the v/orld in terns which make it possi-
ble for devotion, piety, love, beauty, and mystery; and that this
needs evidence, which implies objective reference for it is intrin-
sic .
Dewey makes a distinction between the social and
physical environment of human experience; therefore the social
as a category implies an objective reference of seme sort. He
holds a numerical metaphysical pluralism, whose signii’icance
is destroyed by the absolute experience genetically accounted for.
>11
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'./e agree v/ith him that the starting point of philosophy is the
here bnd the now, but we consider it unerapirical to assert that
these forms of experience are final cind all, Dev/ey clearly
points out the mergence of duality e-nd plurality in reflectionj
but he fails to establish or to find the center of unity and
plurality. He did assert the central position of the self in
all experienced contexts, and lil^e ioodbridge, he says this is
so evident that we need not say much about it. Dewey made only
once the appeal to direct self-experience. It is significant
that he failed to return to it in later reflection. Santayana
points out the "quasi-Hegeliajn tendency" in Dev/ey in that the
individual is dissolved into social functions and the a.ctual
made transitional, Dewey says when you find yourself in a dilemma
concerning a problem, evoke an actual experience and then look
for the meaning of the problem and its implications. This agrees
v/ith Hodgson’s position that philosophy is to be based upon a
"subjective analysis of experience". This also necessitates,
at least in reflection, the subject-object distinction, finally,
Dewey is driven to make matter, life, and mind a uniform reali-
zation of the one single principle, Experience. Other teleologies
are denied, but we have a teleology of experience.
Reality has a content aside from the activities
of the organism. On the plane of mind there is the realm of
meanings. One of the criticisms which Rogers mao.e upon De?/'ey
before the appearance of Ibcperience and Hature v/as that activities
of the organism in Dewey’s thought seems to be identical with
reality. Since then Dewey’s thought shov/s a shift of interest
and a change of position. Positivism and metaphysics are often
I
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the "perchings and flights” in Dewey’s thought.
.•/e agree with Dewey most heartily that we are of
the same nature v/ith reality, yet we are distinct objects in na-
ture, He seems to be coming to recognize more the subject-object
relation, for he says that we must have distinctions in practice.
An act of resolve v/ithout a subject, as Laird asserts, is a con-
tradiction in terms. Dev/ey grants that experience may be viewed
objectively and subjectively. The subjective view of experience
is chiefly the "human attitude and interest record and inter-
pretation". This may be an event in nature, but the fact that
it manifests hur.aan attitude and interest and the fact tha.t it is
both a record and interpretation suffice to emphasize the dis-
tinction.
To sum up, then, v/e Iiave the crucial problems vmich
have been generated from Dewey’s new formulation of exxjerience;
1. Dualism of experience:
The dualism of mediate and iramediate experience,
appreciation and cognition,
the directly had and the indirect,
non-reflec tive and reflective.
2. The problem of value:
Dichotomy of instrumental and intrinsic,
Tleaningless events and meaningful objects.
Conservation of value and objectivity of value.
o. Problem of the function of the individual in unifying
experience
.
4. Can the description of the traits of nature be an intelli
gent explanation of the cosmos, and the clue to
human and moral experience?
5. The subj ect-obj ect relation is a problem which Dewey has
throv'/n 3.way too casually.
6. The universa.l question of the ultimate prupose of life
is neglected. Causality is neglected.
7. The problem of the new "Absolute", lixperience, is left
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B. Conclusion.
The meaning of experience in the thought of John
Dewey is fundamental and is the huh of his whole system of thought.
His interpretation of experience is highly speculative in that
it includes methodology, metaphysics (which is cosmology for him),
and axiology. Tixperience is inclusive because it means whatever
happens in the universe. Svery happening has its intrinsic worth,
but in the on-going of life preference is imperative, for there
are rough junctures resulting from interaction, which must be
smoothed over; hence his instrumentalism. Judgment among the
preferences is necessary. The intrinsic values are converted
into instrumental values brcause judgment always implies a third
thing, an end. This is experience on the plane of meaning, ITean-
ings occur when natural events are in interaction. But there
is a non-reflective plane or stage of experience where values
are immediately had or enjoyed. The irvaediacy of existence is
ineffable yet unicno'.m and unknowable. Reality or experience is
Becoming, the lif e-grov/th-process . 'Qualities of values are
"invaluable" for they are "intrinsic". The principle of contin-
uity is imperative and evident because it is a practical affair
to have distinctions and generalities and because in activity
the distinctions and generalities are seen to be phases of the
same continuous process of life.
iixperience, then, as a methodology cautions us
that everything experienced must be found somewhere and sometime.
The synonym for this method is the empirical or denotative method,
which points out where, when, and how a designated description
#
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has arrived. V/hen it denotes soraething specific and differential,
it is a principle of criticism and estimation. Dewey attempts
a coherence criterion, for "both rational and empirical are one
in the life-process. Denotation, in other words, in this sense
implies connotation; the descriptive side and the normative side
are combined. But a, limit is set to the most inclusive experience
or experience method; that is, experience is the here and the now,
v/hich has the deposit of the past and the potentiality for .the
future. The carriers of the values from the past are not speci-
fically endowed entities. Svery activity, physical or mental, is
a natural event. Each can be denotatively found.
Experience as a metaphysics affords an "infinite"
term which signifies both the potential and the actual qualities
of experience. Experience "suggests a,bout itself", that is,
.eXjperience is identified v:ith nature, the diverse interacting ele-
ments of the objective world. To find the traits of nature or
this objective world is the problem of metaphysics. The predomin-
ant trait of nature is its hazardousness in the process of becoming.
This is fundainental to our moral and practical problem, the pro-
blem of control, of adaptation, and of adjustment. Contrary to
the pragmatic tradition, that ethics precedes metaphysics and
to his own assertion that all philosophy is a branch of morals,
Dev/ey has made metax)hysics prior to ethics. But his metaphysics
is limited by the practical or functional interest and suffers
from abstraction, lloreover, he regards choice and judgment as
having nothing to do with existential and metaphysical nature of
of experience. Ke separates the m^ral and axiological questions
from the metaphysical so that the problem of ultimate teleology
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has no footing in his system.
The emx)hasis on the "situation" is one of the
outstanding characteristios of Dev/ey’s thought. Ideals are the
possibilities of natural events. They are continuous v/i th the
natural, the problematic situation, lleliorism and opportunism,
and nothing more, is the resultant theory. However, Devrey has
set up a criterion which is applicable to every situation. The
individual v/ith his implicit critical judgment ought to go through
a more formal disciiDline whereby he may convert the immediate
values into those which would be valid for thought, right for
conduct, and cultivated for appreciation. Respect for experience
and intellectual piety and fidelity toward e:q)erience are the
foundation for a "great coiTimunity of free persons". Dewey’s
interpretation of experience, then, is a philosophy of life.
Aspiration for the whole meaning of experience engenders a "joy-
ful emancipation".
Dewey’s experience-philosophy began as a protest
against any isolated and self-contained reality but has ended
by setting up just such an entity, namely, }?yent. A paradox!
"For the total occurrence in a.ll its chsjiging complexity has
been substituted for one aspect of itself which is nov/ held to
2
possess that concrete reality vdiich has been claimed for Event,"
Cr. P. Adams points out that more crucial and primary than the
question of what the immediately given is, is the "possibility
3
of any self-contained entity of whatever sort of being thus given."
The essential objective of the new formulation of experience, as
we have seen, aims at "continuity" over against dualism. The
ijrotest against dichotomy and bifurcation has paved the way for
1f
i
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new dichotomies and bifurcations.' iUiotlier paradox!
The culmination of a curious combination of volun-
tarism, hedonism, and modern psychology is found in the much-dis-
cussed theory, "immediate empiricism" or "irvnediate experience",
Y/hich is more treasured by pragmatism and realism than by any
other systems of thought, Dewey tells us that "the realism of
.
4immediate equalities contains everything of .vorth and si'^nificance" •
5
" ’
"ii.imediacy of existence is ineffable". v/ith this thesis, Dewey
speaks of "the conspicuous and vivid presence of immediate qualities
6 '
and of meanings," Piatt shov/s that Dewey has on several occa-
sions admi oted elements of thought and some degree of meaning in
immediate experience. But Hall, liurphy, and others have also
iJointed out that PIvent is often set up as the "unknown god", a,nd
as such it is a characterless or meaningless content. It commits
what Adams calls, "the fallacy of detached and self-contained
ii'Viediacy"
, Dewey tells us that the immediately given is not the
good, the desirable. The ulterior, the reached-and- justified-by-
reflection, the desired and the reasonable goods, the cultivated,
and the beliefs de jure are of v/ider contexts and structures.
But the latter are the continuations of the former.
His overemphasis on "genetic continuity" strengthen
his naturalism, but misses the dictations of experience more
faith in ideas and ideals. His undue wholesale castigation of
historical attempts of philosophy compels him to fight a stra\7
man of diversified concreteness and suffers from the "fallacy
of mis-placed concreteness", as V/hitehead puts it. Dreams and
fancies have a place in Dewey’s experience, but the problem of
; .v' i
c
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tiie conservation of values, the problem of iinraortality, and the
interest in "whither mankind" are omitted from his interpretation
of experience. In his "flanking movement" and his pre-occupation
with clearing the tub, the baby is poured out with the bath.
However, Dewey has made av..new path by his new emphases and new
’ formulations, and has stimulated more thought. In view of the
fact that he is still living and vigorous in thinking and that
his followers are interpreting and developing his thought, one
may say that the neglected problems and the generated problems
may come to solution.
Ic
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CJ. Summary in Propositions.
The result of this investigation is summarized in
ten propositions, which include statements of Dewey’s interpre-
tation of experience, the significant contributions in his theory
of experience, and nev/ difficulties in his formulation- -of the
experience-philosophy.
« I
1. Experience is the v/hole of life-process which
is iiTiraediately given and ineffable.
2. Experience is absolute in the sense that it
is identical with reality, "suggests about itself", and is con-
ceived through itself.
3. l-ibcperience is an "infinite" term, including
events (the metaphysical elements, existence, explicandum ) and
objects (events with meanings, explanatio
)
.
4. Experience is of intrinsic worth, and contains
specific -values, which require critical judgment in their reali-
zation.
5. The emphasis upon continuity and activity has
reconciled humanism and intellec tualism.
6. The emphasis upon empirical method affords a
reconciliation of science and philosophy, and encourages freedom
* and plasticity of thought.
7. His protest against dichotomy and bifurcation
has paved the way for new dichotomies and bifurcations such as
events and objects, existence and meaning, moral and metaphysical,
or natural and practical.
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8. Dev/ey’s experience-philosophy began as a pro-
test against ajiy isolated and self-contained reality but has
ended by setting up just such an entity, namely, jiiVent.
9. Contrary to the pragmatic tradition that ethics
ijrecedes metaphysics and to his oviji assertion that all philosophy
is a branch of morals, Dewey has made metaphysics prior to ethics.
10.
Contrary to the empirical spirit and the all-
inclusive experience, certain manifestations of experience find
no recognition, such as the. problem of conservation of values,
the problem of ii:]raortality, and the interest in "whither manxind".
oc
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